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ABSTRACT 
 
Carney, Elizabeth The World War II Home Front in New York State: 
Evaluating the Success of the Office of Civilian 
Mobilization in Stimulating Volunteer Efforts 
 
The image of a unified home front of individuals and communities who rallied their 
efforts for a patriotic cause during World War Two is a widely held popular belief, supported by 
some scholars.  This thesis examines the validity of the claim and whether or not mobilization 
efforts were a natural disposition for many Americans.  Did citizens join together and engage in 
grass roots mobilization to strengthen the home front or merely act in their own self interest and 
only take substantial action when put under pressure by the government?  The study relies on the 
records of the New York State War Council, specifically of the Office of Civilian Mobilization 
(OCM), which was responsible for establishing volunteer programs on the home front.  
The records reveal that the Office strenuously put forth efforts to push the localities to do 
more, increased its control over the counties’ and cities’ war efforts, and eventually conducted 
programs on its own.  A great effort on the state Office’s part was required to get the majority of 
New Yorkers to serve their communities on the terms set out by the organization.  In some 
counties, such as Schenectady, local war councils were effective in stimulating volunteer efforts.  
However, Schenectady was more of an exception because it head-started many of its programs 
prior to state intervention.  Participation in New York State mobilization efforts was therefore 
quite irregular and the war did not galvanize patriotism to the extent that was popularized by 
earlier sources.        
The OCM’s efforts also reveal the central role that women played in the efforts to 
mobilize home front volunteers due to numbers that participated in their programs, specifically 
as Block Leaders.  In deciding to volunteer instead of join the labor force, many women chose 
the “traditional” avenue for serving the war effort.  This fact also demonstrates that the war 
helped to maintain instead the conventional attitude about women and their place in society.   
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
On December 7th, 1941, the Japanese America was drawn into a world war for the second 
time.  Having suffered from a Great Depression for almost a decade, the War provided the 
economic recovery the country needed.  Higher wages, an income tax, and large scale mass 
production gave America a chance to fight for a just cause and return to a prosperous leading 
world power.  Thousands of aircrafts, naval vessels, tanks, and guns were produced in a short 
period of time.  America’s economy was not the only aspect of society affected by the war.  
Some groups of people, such as women, were able to achieve new opportunities by joining the 
work force.  While others, such a Japanese Americans lost all their rights when they were placed 
in internment camps.  From the absence of a father or brother who was serving overseas to 
rationing important materials such as rubber, most families felt the impact of the war at home.   
 Another important aspect of World War II was the ways in which the states were able to 
mobilize their citizens and therefore contribute significantly to the war effort.  According to 
author Karl Drew Hartzell, America’s success in winning the war did not only depend on the 
strength and vigor of its soldiers but on the actions of the 48 states; the operation of such a large 
scale endeavor could not be handled from Washington alone.1  The states were responsible for 
implementing the national government’s policies and creating their own war programs that were 
vital for carrying out the war effectively.  One of the states that played an important role in the 
effort and created a comprehensive war program was New York. 
 With ten percent of the country’s population, New York had a large responsibility in war 
mobilization.  It was also one of the wealthiest states, largest manufacturing centers, and held the 
nation’s major port.  Most importantly, New York had $21.5 million worth of war contracts by 
                                                 
1 Karl Drew Hartzell, The Empire State at War: World War II (New York: The State of New York, 1949), xi. 
the end of the war.2  How was New York able to accomplish such a large feat?  According to Mr. 
Hartzell, It was not only the state’s population and availability of large production plants but the 
skilled leadership and organization of its war council that was able to successfully mobilize an 
entire state.3  The purpose of the War Council, established originally as the State Defense 
Council in 1940, was to coordinate the state’s efforts to sufficiently mobilize civilians and 
therefore contribute effectively to the war effort.  New York State’s War Council was therefore 
concerned with establishing programs that recruited volunteers for every aspect of the home 
front, training and educating the public, and dealing with any issues that arose in specific cities 
with regards to mobilization. A section of the War Council that played an important role in the 
daily lives of citizens, especially women, was the Division of Civilian Mobilization.   
 What began as a small division of Women’s participation on the State Defense Council 
eventually turned into one of three main components of the New York State War Council, and 
would come to involve over one million volunteers in defense efforts.4  Just as protecting 
citizen’s lives and property was important during the war, the mass mobilization and 
coordination of volunteers for community services would serve a significant purpose in fighting 
the war at home.  The main purpose of what came to be known as the Division of Civilian 
Mobilization was to allow ways for individuals, particularly women, on the home front to aid 
America in the war.  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, it appeared that many Americans were 
ready and eager to help in any way they could.  The State had to come up with an organized and 
efficient method to utilize their energies and resources towards the war effort.5  The Volunteer 
Division was initially a small operation which placed and organized volunteers. It eventually 
                                                 
2 Hartzell, Empire State at War, xi-xii. 
3 Ibid, xii. 
4 Ibid, 129. 
5 Ibid, 128. 
turned into a comprehensive network of over 600 volunteer offices that directed and carried out 
state mobilization programs while also promoting community services.  Whether it was by 
providing leadership opportunities for civilians or a day care center for the new working mother, 
the programs created by the Division of Civilian Mobilization covered numerous aspects of 
citizens’ lives and affected a large number of New Yorkers in one way or another.  
  The work of this office was significant for utilizing the skills and energies of those who 
wanted to make home front mobilization a success. Although not every state had large numbers 
of citizens who were willing and ready to do what they could at home to win the war.  One 
finding of this thesis was that civilian mobilization was not a natural disposition for many and 
had to be driven by the efforts of the Division of Civilian Mobilization. In New York, the 
Division imposed more and more on the local war councils to fully mobilize their communities 
for civilian services. As demonstrated by its records, the State Division of Civilian Mobilization 
strenuously put forth efforts to push the localities to do more, increase its control over the 
counties’ and cities’ war efforts, and eventually conduct  programs and activities on its own.  
Some local war councils, such as in Schenectady County, were able to efficiently mobilize 
individuals and make a substantial effort in fighting the war at home.  However, Schenectady 
served as a model example because it took many initiatives on its own and was therefore an 
exception.  For the most part, many local councils did not meet the hopes and expectations of the 
state-level planners.  By examining the Office of Civilian Mobilization’s records, it is evident 
that great efforts on the state officials’ part were required to get the majority of New Yorkers to 
serve their communities, especially initially, on the terms set out by the organization.  The New 
York State Office of Civilian Mobilization’s efforts during the war help to shed light on a more 
realistic view of what the home front looked like and how people experienced the war. 
Participation in New York State mobilization efforts was therefore quite irregular and the war 
did not galvanize patriotism to the extent that was popularized by the media and earlier historical 
sources.  This revelation is part of a larger debate in the scholarly sources on whether or not 
World War II was the “good” war in that it unified the majority of Americans to sacrifice their 
efforts for the common goal of winning the war.            
 It is only in recent decades that the significant wartime home front has been viewed as an 
important subject of historical research and become a popular topic of scholarly work.6 As a 
result, there is now a wide selection of scholarly sources that look into the various aspects of the 
effects of the war.  Readers are now offered lively disputes over a variety of subjects, such as 
how the war impacted the home front and specific groups of people like women.     
According to author John Jeffries, there were two dominant frameworks that shaped the 
analysis of the war’s domestic impacts: the idea that World War II was both a true watershed and 
the “good” war in American history.7  In Jeffries opinion, it is these two ideas that provided the 
structure for understanding the war years for their complexities and historical context.  Jeffries 
also described how some authors have disputed these popular views.  These changes in 
interpretations came about during the war’s 50th anniversary when long term effects could be 
analyzed and the war’s impact reevaluated.8  Jeffries explained how the two frameworks 
emerged in the first place and could now be disputed.  Similar to Jeffries, author Allan Winkler 
argued that in the post war era many American historians primarily focused on the Great 
Depression and the urgent threat of the Cold War rather than the war.9  When America entered 
Vietnam, more scholars began to look back at World War II more systematically and primarily 
                                                 
6 Allan M. Winkler, “World War II Home Front: A Historiography,” OAH Magazine of History 16 (2002): 5.   
7 John W. Jeffries, Wartime America: The WWII Home Front (Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1996), 4. 
8 Jeffries, Wartime America, 8. 
9 Winkler, “World War II Home front: A Historiography,” 5. 
looked into how the war was fought.  They also emphasized the notion that World War II was 
the “good” war.  The war was “good” because Americans had contributed greatly to an allied 
victory while fighting valiantly and with honor; democracy had triumphed.10  America had also 
emerged from the war as one of the wealthiest nations in the world, leaving the Great Depression 
in its past. Most importantly, the war was for the most part fully supported at home and fought 
by a country unified behind the sole purpose of taking down the Axis powers.  The sources 
focused on the idea that America emerged a superpower and defeated one of the most 
threatening manifestations of evil ever seen in human history. The war years were therefore 
remembered as the golden days.  
America’s involvement in Vietnam was also contrasted with the country’s World War II 
experience, sharpening this sentiment.  Many Americans did not support Vietnam because they 
viewed it as the war where American soldiers committed war crimes, suffered severe post 
traumatic stress, and died for reasons which perhaps they and their families did not understand.  
Many Americans did not truly believe in America’s involvement in Vietnam because it was used 
as a tool for U.S. national interests.  Vietnam was also the war that United States did not clearly 
“win.”11  While the country had recently emerged from the “bad” war of Vietnam, Americans 
needed to be reminded of their “glory days;” when they had helped to defeat Nazis, left a Great 
Depression in its wake, and created a better future for their country.  For these reasons, the myth 
of World War II as the “good” war emerged largely in the post Vietnam era by scholars of the 
time period.   
When the time came for the 50th anniversary of World War II in the 1990s, the scholarly 
consensus had begun to shift.  These scholars have argued that World War II was not the 
                                                 
10 Jeffries, Wartime America, 9. 
11 Michael C. C. Adams, The Best War Ever: America and World War II (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994), 15. 
mythical “good” war that so many remembered. The long term effects could be analyzed and 
understood for their negative implications on the country as a whole.  World War II could now 
be seen for its psychological impacts on veterans, the discriminatory practices that continued to 
exist at home and in the military, and its internment of thousands of innocent Japanese 
Americans.  The war also permitted the government to become very coercive and intrusive, 
tended to help the rich more than the poor, and disrupted communities across the country.12 
These examples demonstrated why World War II could no longer be depicted as the golden days 
in our county’s history. 
Many of the sources which helped to shape the “good” war view focused on similar 
themes in order to effectively prove their opinions.  These types of sources largely discussed how 
the war inspired nationalism, created better opportunities for minorities, and ended the Great 
Depression that had plagued America for so long.  For example, Keith L. Nelson’s The Impact of 
War on America Life: The Twentieth-Century Experience (1971) examined the impacts of the 
major wars in America’s history and was composed of articles written by other scholars. The 
section on World War II dealt with the war’s impact on America’s economy, politics, society, 
and culture.  Nelson’s own brief analysis of the war claimed that it was in many ways “a less 
shattering experience” than the First World War.13  According to Nelson, World War II left 
America with a position of command because its own territory was free of destruction and it had 
recovered from an economic collapse.14 In order to support his view about the war, Nelson 
included specific articles that paralleled his own opinions.  For example, the article included by 
Ernest W. Burgess argued that the status of women reached incredible heights while Richard 
                                                 
12 Jeffries, Wartime America, 10-11. 
13 Keith L. Nelson, edit., The Impact of War on American Life: The Twentieth-Century Experience (New York: Holt, 
Rinhart and Winston, Inc., 1971), 93. 
14 Nelson, Impact American Life, 94. 
Dalfiume wrote about how World War II served as the “seedbed” for the Civil Rights 
movement.15  Nelson also incorporated an article written by Merle Curti, which argued that the 
war created a strong sense of nationalism; this was especially evident overseas where an effort 
was seen to promote systems and ideals similar to that of America.  Curti argued that Many 
Americans felt proud of what their country had accomplished and that “no war had been fought 
with as much unanimity as World War II.”16   
 Richard Polenberg’s War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 (1972) also focused 
on the positive achievements of the war.  For example, his chapter on the social impact of the 
war stated his view that sacrifices were made by everyone on the home front, but that these could 
not really be characterized as sacrifices because Americans wanted to contribute to the war. 17 
Most people believed that their country was fighting for a good cause and they wanted to help in 
any way they could.  There were “victory gardens” planted, drives hosted to collect valuable 
resources such as plastic and metal, and corps of auxiliary police were organized.18  Polenberg 
also conceded that racial injustice continued, but that the war brought about the beginnings of the 
government’s undermining of discrimination, such as with the Supreme Court’s decision to ban 
white-only primaries.19 Like Nelson, Polenberg used both nationalism and the slight changes in 
race relations as examples of positive impacts of the wartime era.   
Another source that helped to fashion the myth of the “good” war was Gerald D. Nash’s 
The Great Depression and World War II: Organizing America, 1933-1945 (1979).  Nash’s main 
                                                 
15 Ernest W. Burgess, “The Changing Family,” and Richard Dalfiume, “Beginning the Negro Revolution,” in Impact 
of War on American Life: The Twentieth-Century Experience, ed. Keith L. Nelson (New York: Holt, Rinhart and 
Winston, Inc., 1971), 133. 
16Merle Curti, “Militant Nationalism,” in Impact of War on American Life: The Twentieth-Century Experience, ed. 
Keith L. Nelson (New York: Holt, Rinhart and Winston, Inc., 1971),159. 
17 Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 
1972), 132. 
18 Polenberg, War and Society, 133. 
19 Ibid, 243. 
argument was that the Second World War dragged America out of the depression and into the 
role of a super power and also allowed for minorities to attain great achievements.  Like Nelson 
and Polenberg, Nash argued that the war created ways for minorities to attain some aspects of 
equality.  They had new job opportunities, federal regulations requiring fair employment 
practices, and could now serve in the army.20  Urbanization also led to the migration of large 
groups of minorities to cities, therefore lending them more political power.21  Nash also agreed 
that not all the impacts of World War II were positive, but that it should be remembered most 
importantly for ending the Great Depression and transforming the mood of Americans from 
cynicism and dread to that of “optimism and high expectations of the future.”22  
 Paul D. Casdorph’s Let the Good Times Roll: Life at Home in America during World 
War II (1989) also contributed to the sentiment that World War II was the “good war.”   
Casdorph’s book looked specifically into the domestic impacts of the Second World War and 
believed that it altered every type of relationship in one way or another.  Most importantly, the 
war put money back into Americans’ pockets, causing the “good times to roll along.”23 Casdorph 
concluded that America exited the war much better off than when it had entered, and that the war 
years were generally ones of happiness for those who participated in them.  Casdorph described a 
picture of a prosperous nation where nationalism had reached new heights; veterans had returned 
home with the common feeling that they had served a just cause.24  In characterizing the 
sentiment of those Americans who did not fight or lose loved ones, “World War II was nothing 
short of wonderful.”   After all, America had helped to defeat Hitler and Tojo and emerged from 
                                                 
20 Gerald D. Nash, The Great Depression and World War II: Organizing America, 1933-1945 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., 1979), 144. 
21 Nash, Organizing America, 144. 
22 Ibid, 158. 
23Paul D. Casdorph,  Let the Good Times Roll: Life at Home in America during World War II (New York: Paragon 
House, 1989), ix. 
24 Casdorph, Good Times Roll, 257. 
the war with their territory unscathed.  Casdorph’s book left the readers with a sense that it was 
indeed the “good war” for those Americans who had experienced it.25  
Another book that has often been placed in the same category as Nash’s, Nelson’s, and 
Casdorph’s works was Studs Terkel "The Good War": An Oral History of World War II (1989).  
Terkel’s book served to tell the story of World War II through the words of those who actually 
experienced it.  The stories of nurses, civilians, soldiers, and laborers are explained on the pages 
through interviews conducted by the author.  Although Terkel does not leave out the horrific, 
gruesome, and awful aspects that many people witnessed and experienced during the war.  At the 
same time, “The Good War” carried a positive theme throughout and depicted an image of a 
country that emerged from WWII a better, stronger, and invigorated nation.  For example, one 
veteran claimed, “I honestly feel grateful for having been a witness to an event as monumental as 
anything in history and, in a very small way, a participant.”26   
Starting in the 1980s, a series of books began to challenge the view held by many 
Americans that World War II was the “good war”.  One of the first sources to do this was Paul 
Fussell’s Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (1989). Fussell paints 
a very different picture than the one depicted by Nash or Casdorph.  A World War II veteran 
himself, Fussell began his book by directly stating how “For the past fifty years the allied war 
has been…romanticized almost beyond recognition by the sentimental…I have tried to balance 
the scales.”27 Wartime took the reader into the battlefield and allowed them to see what the war 
really looked like from a soldier’s perspective.  Fussell described the soldier resorting to alcohol 
to relieve the stress, fear, and boredom; it became difficult for many soldiers to perform their 
                                                 
25 Ibid, 248. 
26 Studs Terkel, "The Good War": An Oral History of World War II (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 16. 
27 Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), ix. 
duties without some “alcohol insulation.”28 He also discussed how citizens were often deprived 
of the resources that had previously been easily obtainable.  His book had a section on rationing 
certain materials, such as rubber, paper, whiskey, and other common conveniences to 
demonstrate a negative impact of the war on the home front. Many Americans experienced 
“distinct shock” when they were told by the government that they could no longer buy what they 
wanted because visible consumption traditionally indicated a level of wealth and governed the 
“psychological relations” among individuals.29  This constriction on American’s rights as 
consumers was therefore a “heavy blow to the psyche.”30 His final chapter was perhaps the most 
important because it argued that the real war experienced by the soldiers would never be known 
by those who did not endure it nor accurately portrayed to the public.31  According to Fussell, the 
optimistic propaganda and publicity surrounding the war had created an experience so opposite 
the truth that the soldiers would never be able to convey to the public what their experiences 
were truly like on the front; the home front had no idea of the reality that was World War II.  
With a powerful conclusion, “…the meaning of the war seemed inaccessible.  As experience, 
thus, the suffering was wasted.  America has not yet understood what the Second World War was 
like…”32 
   Michael C. C. Adams’ The Best War Ever: America and World War II (1994) also 
argued against the popular “good war” view. Adams’ book differs from Fussell in that he did not 
use personal accounts or primary sources to make his conclusions.  Instead, he primarily draws 
on what other authors have used as evidence for the “good war” myth in order to provide a new 
analysis of similar evidence to paint a more realistic picture of the home front.  Adams does 
                                                 
28 Fussell, Wartime, 101.  
29 Ibid, 101. 
30 Ibid, 195. 
31 Ibid, 269. 
32 Ibid, 268. 
mention Fussell as an excellent source for understanding the war front and for also paralleling 
his own views that the Allied victory had obscured the wars imperfect realities.33  Adams wanted 
his readers to understand the war for all of its dimensions and challenge the oversimplified and 
glorified image of the war that had been created by earlier scholars and the popular media.  
Adams began by describing how America had essentially “reinvented” its past.34 He argued that 
over time popular memory became a selective memory and everything about the war that had 
been difficult and caused hardship was forgotten; a better past was created.35  In Adams’ view, 
World War II was a brutalizing experience for many that caused mass destruction, permitted for 
injustices to occur, and left physical and mental scars on veterans.  The war also completely 
disrupted the fabric of American society that nurtured conformity and only created more 
obstacles for many minorities.36  His work did not demean the achievements of the United States 
and democracy in the war, but wanted the reader to understand all of its complexities.    
 The views of authors such as Adams, now held by many other historians, has even 
caused some initial proponents of the “good war” thesis to publish works that refuted their 
original publications.  One of these authors was Richard Polenberg.  Twenty years after writing 
his book, War and Society (1972), he published an article titled, “The Good War? A Reappraisal 
of How World War II Affected American Society,” in The Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography.  He began by describing why in fact World War II had primarily been seen as a 
positive experience for America: it was fought by people united under one cause, brought 
immense prosperity, and created opportunities for many minority groups.37  At the same time, 
                                                 
33 Adams, Best War Ever, 137. 
34 Ibid, 1. 
35 Ibid, 1. 
36 Ibid, 154. 
37 Richard Polenberg, “The Good War? A Reappraisal of How World War II Affected American Society,” The 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 100 (1992): 296.   
new revelations had come to light that caused Polenberg to reevaluate how the war truly 
impacted the home front.  He discussed how during the war the government had imposed 
extensive censorship, labor had “subordinated” the interests of their workers for the government, 
and racist practices continued both in the work place and military.38    
Polenberg’s original book, War and Society (1972) also evaluated another important 
aspect of the war that was important for understanding its impact on the home front.  This was 
whether or not the war radically altered the fabric and character of American society.  His book 
therefore focused on another important World War II debate that has been the topic of many 
World War II sources: had the war directly caused changes that occurred on the home front or 
merely accelerated changes that were part of trends that had been unfolding in America for 
years? It was therefore not only a question of whether it had positive or negative impacts, but 
whether or not these impacts were caused by the war or merely hastened  by it.  Putting it clearly 
in his prologue, “Pearl Harbor marked more than the passing of a decade; it signified the end of 
an old era and the beginning of a new.”39 War and Society pointed out how the government’s 
power greatly increased because of the war.  World War II had allowed for the federal 
government to employ more Americans, spend more money, and increased the number of 
interactions with civilians.  Most importantly, the war era required a government that exercised 
greater control over the lives of its citizens.40 The war also changed America’s foreign policy; it 
was no longer about whether the country should try and remain neutral and isolated but how 
much she should intervene in other nation’s affairs, especially when it came to the threat of 
                                                 
38 Polenberg, “The Good War?” 299. 
39 Polenberg, War and Society, 4. 
40 Ibid, 240.  
democracy.41   In general, Polenberg’s book argued that the war was a watershed in American 
history. 
John Blum’s V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II 
(1976) also addressed the question of whether World War II was a watershed in American 
history or a catalyst for change but reached a different conclusion than Polenberg.  Blum’s book 
was not so much a complete analysis of the home front as a whole but rather looked at specific 
aspects of American culture and politics during the war era and how they were interrelated. V 
was For Victory attempted to explain how the wartime experience influenced and often times 
shaped the expectations of many Americans for the future of their country both at home and 
abroad.42  Contrary to Polenberg, Blum emphasized the changes which occurred on the home 
front as continuities rather than direct results of the war.  For example, he discussed how similar 
to other minority groups, African Americans suffered from white hostility during the war.  
However, black oppression at the hands of whites had existed since the 17th century and was 
therefore not a new aspect of American society. Even while America was preparing for the war, 
many black Americans found themselves excluded from industry.43  As Blum pointed out, 
numerous black Americans were extremely unhappy with the prejudice that constantly 
constrained their lives.  Prior to America’s entry in the war, blacks began to take action to gain 
equality.  For example, A. Phillip Randolph, soon to be head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters, began planning a Negro march on Washington beginning in January 1941.  Randolph 
wanted to put pressure on the Federal Government to demand the rights of blacks in National 
                                                 
41 Ibid, 242. 
42 John Morton Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II. ( New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976),  xi.   
43 Blum, V Was for Victory, 185. 
Defense Employment and the armed forces.44  The war had essentially intensified the determined 
will of blacks to attain freedom and equality because many African Americans had joined an 
inherently segregated war effort.  President Roosevelt responded with an Executive Order that 
established the Fair Employment Practices Committee to ensure that there was no discrimination 
in the hiring practices in the government and defense industries.  Although, the Committee 
proved limited and discrimination practices still took place during the war.  Nevertheless, the 
sentiment for change which eventually took place with regards to blacks’ rights began to take 
root prior to America’s entry into the war.  Blum also used the struggle of African Americans to 
demonstrate how the American culture influenced politics at the time; “In wartime, indeed, 
politics reflected as much as ever the many aspects of American culture…and, not the least, the 
desires and the anguish of the outsiders, especially the blacks.”45   
The second edition of Allan Winkler’s Home Front U.S.A.: America During World War 
II, (2000) reinforced the watershed theory proposed by Polenberg.  Home Front dealt primarily 
with the way American society changed during the war time period by discussing how the 
economy, politics, and society were impacted by the war.  Originally published in 1986, Winkler 
argued how World War II truly transformed all aspects of American society and was a watershed 
in the country’s history.  Winkler pointed out how during the war period there was a 
demographic shift, some minority groups were allowed social and economic gains (while others 
were not), industry and big business grew substantially, and the federal government’s power also 
increased.46  In Winkler’s conclusion he addressed how not all of these changes could be seen as 
factors of the war and some were indeed accelerated by the war.  Nevertheless, Winkler’s main 
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46 Allan M. Winkler, Home Front, U.S.A.: America during World War II (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 2000), 107-
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point is that the war completely transformed America’s way of life.   The changes American 
society experienced were extensive, had both positive and negative effects, and impacted every 
American’s life at home in one way or another.  According to Winkler, “…the changes that 
occurred between 1940 and 1945 stand out vividly…the transformation the United States 
experienced was profound.”47    With his second edition, Winkler addressed in his prologue the 
new literature which had been written about World War II since his first publication.  He 
discussed how the war had generally been viewed as a positive experience because of the 
opportunities it offered many people, the recovery it created of the U.S. economy from the Great 
Depression, and it allowed for the triumph of democracy.  At the same time, Winkler noted that 
this view had been recently disputed by many scholars.48  With these new publications and the 
passing years, American had begun to realize the long term consequences of their war time 
experiences and decisions.  Winkler does not agree nor disagree with these new scholars, but 
introduces their new point of view as a way to “examine even more carefully the home front 
achievements and repercussions of the greatest struggle of all time.”49  Although these new 
revelations are discussed, Winkler still interpreted World War II as a true turning point in 
American history.  
Jeffries Wartime America (1996) was neither in agreement nor opposition to Winkler’s 
Home Front and the sources already discussed.  Jeffries book can be characterized as a 
culmination of all the authors and their arguments mentioned above in that he does not render a 
simple verdict as to whether or not the war was a watershed and the good war.  He instead 
analyzed the effects on the home front using these two frameworks to understand the 
                                                 
47 Ibid, 110.   
48Ibid, 2-3.  
49 Ibid, 4. 
“complicated impact” of the war on America.50  Jeffries weaved together a balanced analysis of 
the traditional arguments and revisionists opinions.  His book began by discussing how and why 
the revisionists’ theories formed and what their main points were.  According to Jeffries, the 
main arguments of the revisionists was that social changes were not a direct result of the war and 
that it could not be seen as “good” because of its negative long term impacts.  Jeffries does not 
have a decisive opinion on the debates and instead analyzed how both sides of the arguments 
could be seen in America during the war years.  He discussed how one could find both changes 
and continuity during the war years.  For example, the war created new circumstances for 
minorities that laid the foundation for change in the postwar era.  At the same time, patterns such 
as the ethnic prejudice and fears of disloyalty during the war years were a consequence of 
significant continuities form the past.51  For Jeffries, it was also impossible to define whether 
World War II was the “good war” because the war’s impact differed from person to person, 
group to group, and area to area.52 An example he used was how women and African Americans 
were given new opportunities and political power because of the war, but these changes were not 
always welcomed by all.  Many whites resisted the advancement of blacks and people devoted to 
the traditional way of life grew concerned over the changing role of women.53  He believed it 
was the historian’s job to analyze, understand, and explain rather than offer judgment.  As stated 
by Jeffries, “there were many different experiences in wartime America, a variety of stories and 
developments that must be probed to gauge the domestic impact and meaning of World War 
II.”54 Wartime America was therefore a thorough analysis of the home front experience because 
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it explained how the war was a complex event in history that could not be simply characterized 
as either good or bad and a watershed or an accelerating factor.   
When discussing the impacts of the war on the home front, all of the mentioned works 
touched on how specific groups of people were affected.  They mainly used the war’s effects on 
blacks and women to demonstrate whether or not the war made opportunities for great 
advancements possible and if these opportunities had laid the foundation for future social 
changes.  Relating to the larger debate about the war in general, most of the literature dealing 
with women’s roles in World War II has evaluated the popular idea that the war profoundly 
changed women’s lives for the better.  Many earlier sources argued that the war brought positive 
changes for women due to the opportunities it offered them in the various industries, although it 
is disputed whether or not these changes continued in the post war era and played an important 
role in shaping the future role of women in society.         
An example of the traditional view of the war’s impacts on women’s employment is 
William H. Chafe’s The Paradox of Change: American Women in the 20th Century (1991) which 
studied the political and social experience of women in America throughout the 20th century. 
Chafe’s book was originally published in 1972, when the literature on women’s history had just 
begun to gain legitimacy.55  He made changes to his first edition in order to acknowledge the 
impact of the scholarship that emerged over the past two decades with regards to women’s 
history and used the new evidence of women’s experience with a more “up to date conceptual 
framework.”56  Chafe points out these developments, although they do not change his 
interpretation of the war’s impacts on women.  He argued that World War II dramatically altered 
the economic situation for women, increasing the size of the labor force by 50% (three out of 
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four were married), and that even public attitudes began to change with the government and 
media encouraging them to work.  Many women decided that they wanted to remain in the 
workforce, although their postwar jobs paid less and were more often than not traditional 
women’s work.  Despite the fact that conventional ideals on a woman’s place in the world 
persisted, women’s lives had changed and a new era of potential activity was now open to them; 
the war was a crucial turning point for women in America.57  The war had created a “social 
legitimacy” about working women, especially married women that continued in the post war 
years.  The new advancements achieved by women during the war were instrumental in causing 
the attitude change towards their role in society that took place in the 1960s.58 
Leila J. Rupp’s Mobilizing Women for War: German and American Propaganda, 1939-
1945 (1978) disagreed with Chafe’s original publication and argument about the war’s 
permanent impact on women in the labor force.  Rupp’s book compared the effects of 
propaganda on persuading women to join the work force in the United States and Nazi Germany.  
Rupp demonstrated that the war provided the “first real chance for employment” and that 
propaganda efforts were successful in obtaining women’s participation.59  German and American 
Propaganda also argued that although women were allowed to join the workforce, they did not 
remain there afterwards.  The war was therefore not responsible for permanent changes in the 
participation rate of women in the labor force.60  Rupp also pointed out that the largest incentive 
for women to enter the work force was money.  The war industry offered American women 
higher wages then they could have earned ordinarily.61  
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Karen Anderson’s Wartime Women: Sex Roles, Family Relations, and the Status of 
Women During World War II (1981) evaluated the nature and degree to which the war affected 
the status of women and the development of family life and values.  Similarly to Chafe, 
Anderson argued that women answered the call to take the jobs typically filled by the men who 
had left for war.  Two million married women entered the work force and marked a “temporary 
retreat from prevailing notions of women’s capabilities and proper roles.”62    She agreed with 
Chafe in the sense that women’s lives were permanently changed by the fact that many remained 
in the work force.  Despite the public pressure faced by women to return to their traditional roles 
in society when men returned, many women did stay in the labor force after the war.  For many 
women this meant taking jobs at a lower rate and skill level then they had been used to during 
the war because the “sex-segregated labor market” was restored after the war.63  Anderson 
therefore differed from Chafe in her argument that these positive gains were temporary because 
women’s status in the labor force in the post war era did not improve and many found 
themselves stuck in traditional, dead-end jobs.64  The progressive changes that had occurred 
were largely thwarted in the years following the war and conventional attitudes regarding 
women’s role in society prevailed.     
Following a similar path to Chafe was Nancy Baker Wise and Christy Wise’s A Mouthful 
of Rivets: Women at Work in World War II (1994) and Doris Weatherford’s History of Women in 
America: American Women in World War II (1990) in that both argued that women reached new 
heights of achievement because of the war and stepped forward with great “enthusiasm” to fill 
the roles vacated by the men who had left.   Both sources explained how women struggled and 
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triumphed to make a place for themselves in the various industries that were now available to 
them.  Many women took the jobs provided by the war industries because they needed the 
money to support their families and they also wanted to help their country and therefore felt it 
was their patriotic duty to work. Similarly to Rupp, they differed from Chafe in their claim that 
even though women gained new opportunities, they often returned to their traditional roles 
without protest. Many women were happy to have the important men back in their lives and a 
return to “normalcy” again.65  When the war ended it was no longer their responsibility to work 
and many were glad to see their employment days come to an end.66  
A more detailed study of women’s role both on the front and at home was Emily Yellin’s 
Our Mother’s War: American Women at Home and at the Front During World War II (2004).  
Yellin’s book which also discussed how six million women entered the work force, performed 
non-combatant military work, and made strides in fields such as politics and athletics.  Most 
important for this study is Yellin’s section on the volunteer efforts of women.  Through 
organizations like the Red Cross, the USO, and the Office of Civilian Defense, women were able 
to find ways to aid the war effort from their own neighborhoods.  The programs therefore served 
as ways for women to find outlets for their energy and desire to help.67 Weatherford’s History of 
Women also discussed how women participated in other wartime activities on the home front and 
touched on how women joined volunteer organizations, such as the Women’s Volunteer 
Services, which taught women how to provide emergency services.  According to Weatherford, 
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these organizations accomplished a lot during the war and often provided a great way for 
unemployed women to participate in the war effort.68    
Lizabeth Cohen’s A Consumer’s Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar 
America (2003) and Meg Jacob’s article “How About Some Meat? The Office of Price 
Administration and Consumer Politics, and State Building from the Bottom Up” dealt with a 
different way in which women “volunteered” and aided the war effort on the home front.  The 
Office of Price Administration (OPA) during the war defined a woman’s chief role and 
responsibility to be a smart household consumer.  They served in a variety of different positions 
from OPA price checkers to civilian defense block leaders.69  Women were elevated to a new 
level of civic authority because the government paid close attention to regulating consumption 
which converged with the ideology of women as representatives of their communities’ 
interests.70  By being smart and efficient shoppers for their households, women were serving the 
war effort at home.      
An article which disputed the popular belief over women’s employment during the War 
held by many is Claudia D. Golden’s “The Role of World War II in the Rise of Women’s 
Employment.” Golden argued that the war did allow for many women to join the workforce, 
although the numbers and their implications could not be exaggerated.  According to Golden, the 
war’s impact was modest which can be seen in the fact that more than half of the women who 
entered the workforce between 1940 and 1950 joined after the war was over.71   
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Another important aspect of war was how the home front appeared in specific areas of 
the country.  There are some works that have been written on a state level.  For example, there 
have been books written about what the home front looked like in states such as Michigan and 
New Jersey, but very few on New York State.72  With regards to the state’s effort as a whole, the 
best book to start with is Karl Drew Hartzell’s The Empire State at War: World War II (1949).  
Dr. Hartzell was hired by the New York State War Council to preserve the record of New York’s 
contribution to the war effort.  The book is based on the War Council records currently located at 
the New York State library in Albany.  Empire State at War provided a detailed description of 
New York State during World War II.  Dr. Hartzell’s work was a celebratory account that began 
by claiming that New York’s contribution was successful in aiding America’s victory because it 
had the most wealth, largest population, and the nation’s primary port.  These factors meant New 
York had a “tremendous load to carry.”73 Empire State explored areas such as production for the 
war, the impact of the war upon individuals and communities, and most important for this study, 
civilian mobilization.  He discussed how World War II affected demographic patterns, created 
strains on the home with male figures often missing, and dramatically altered both the economic 
and social patterns of America.74   
One of the only other books that examined New York during World War II was Milton 
M. Klein’s The Empire State: A History of New York (2001).  Although Klein’s study was a 
comprehensive history of New York State, it had a significant chapter that dealt specifically with 
the home front during the war.  Similarly to Hartzell’s study, The Empire State argued that New 
York’s resources were vital for winning the war.  He claimed how the war “marked the height of 
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the Empire Sate’s influence over the country’s economy and culture.”75  Klein also discussed the 
numerous social impacts of the war, some of which were included in the larger debates about the 
effects of the war, such as how labor shortages provided opportunities for women and African 
Americans and child care programs were created to meet the needs of working mothers.  A large 
part of the chapter also focused on war production in the state, such as the defense contracts and 
factories that were produced.  According to Klein, the state manufactured 12% of the United 
States’ war production but was ranked second in value to California for federally financed war 
plants.76   
Most of the sources that have focused on a broad evaluation of World War II’s impacts on the 
home front have dealt primarily with two essential debates.  Was the war a turning point in 
America’s history or were the changes that occurred in its aftermath a result of patterns that had 
developed prior to the conflict?  Was the Second World War also the “good war” that united 
people for a common purpose, whether fighting or on the home front, or did it have more 
negative long term implications that superseded its mythical status?  Many authors have used 
similar evidence to support either view of each debate.  For example, some argued that specific 
groups, such as women, achieved tremendous feats that would have occurred either regardless or 
directly because of the war. Much of the literature on women during World War II has focused 
on their role in the work force to argue that the war was a positive experience; large numbers of 
women entered the labor industry, changing society’s attitude about their role in the world.  
Another significant aspect of women’s contributions to the war was their volunteer 
efforts, which are not a primary focus of the majority of scholarly works.  Many books 
mentioned how they volunteered, although these focused largely on the Red Cross or their 
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cooperation with the OPA and not on their role in the Division of Civilian Mobilization.  
Women’s volunteer work was important in that it demonstrated how pre-war traditional values 
persisted during the war, discrediting the claim of earlier sources that it had been a “good” war 
because it completely changed people’s perception of women and their role in society.   
  Another significant feature of the war was how those who remained at home reacted to 
what was happening overseas.  Did the majority of Americans rally together and engage in grass 
roots mobilization to strengthen the home front or merely act in their own self interest and only 
do what they had to when put under pressure by the government?  This question relates to one of 
the central debates about World War II.  Many earlier sources argued that the war was “good” in 
that the majority of Americans were unified and served their communities wholeheartedly in 
order to fight the war at home.  Others have disagreed and debated that not all citizens were as 
patriotic and collectively participated in civilian mobilization. By examining the Office of 
Civilian Mobilization’s records, it is evident that great efforts on the state officials’ part were 
required to get the majority of New Yorkers to serve their communities on the terms set out by 
the organization.  Participation in New York State mobilization efforts was therefore quite 
irregular and the war did not galvanize patriotism to the extent that was popularized by the media 
and earlier historical sources.  The New York State Office of Civilian Mobilization’s efforts 
during the war help to shed light on a more realistic view of what the home front looked like and 
how people experienced the war.          
Chapter 2: Establishing the Office of Civilian Mobilization 
 World War II was a global conflict like nothing before it in that the vast armies engaged 
in new tactics and used innovative technology on land, sea, and in the air.  This war was not only 
fought by soldiers and required the mobilization of those civilians who remained at home 
working in the factories and salvaging important resources.  On a national level, mobilization for 
the war was taking place prior to America’s official entry after the attack on Pearl Harbor.  On 
May 16, 1940 President Roosevelt called for the production of fifty thousand airplanes annually 
in anticipation of the inevitable surrender of France.1  America began to prepare for the ultimate 
conflict with Germany, and many local governing bodies moved to take action.  The government 
had many new challenges to meet in the months leading up to the War: plants needed to be built 
or expanded, there were new production needs, and wages and prices had to be controlled as to 
prevent inflation.2  The government would ultimately prove successful in meeting these wartime 
demands, although it was not an easy path.  Factors such as the constraints of federal programs 
and liberals’ mistrust in a policy dominated by business made economic mobilization prior to 
Pearl Harbor a slow development.3  The government provided financial support in the form of 
low cost loans or tax write-offs to get businesses to invest in production facilities.4 Numerous 
defense contracts were formed in order to rapidly produce high quality war materials.  The 
Roosevelt Administration’s main concern became mobilizing the country’s resources and 
resulted in the production of planes, battleships, submarines, and secret developments such as the 
atomic bomb.5  This technological mobilization was what America needed in order to leave the 
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Great Depression behind and emerge a renewed and prosperous nation to help win an Allied 
victory.  The United States also had to mobilize people as well, and by the summer of 1941 the 
Army had grown to about 1.5 million men.6 
 Individuals were not only mobilized for the Military, but for home front defense.  In May 
1941, the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) was formed in Washington, D.C. by executive 
order.7 The OCD was formed in order to preserve the welfare of neighborhoods and mobilize 
communities for the war.  The individuals involved in its formation believed that the 
preservation of the education, health, and wellbeing of their families and neighbors was an 
integral part of defending America during a time of war.  Headed by former New York City 
Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, the OCD directed the thousands of programs that served to protect 
and provide for citizens nation-wide.  First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt also played an important role 
in establishing the plans to make use of women’s volunteer power in the defense efforts of 
America.  She worked with LaGuardia, who focused mainly on the civilian protection aspect of 
the division.8 The First Lady became head of the operations of the Volunteer Participation 
Division of the office whose purpose became to find significant activities for locally recruited 
volunteers. Although, the First Lady resigned from the OCD in February 1942 due to the 
criticism she received for taking an official post in her husband’s administration; she believed 
she was hindering the program rather than helping reach its maximum effectiveness.9  As head of 
the Volunteer Participation Division, she and LaGuardia toured the local communities to see the 
progress of the Volunteer Divisions of the local councils which initially “had beautiful plans on 
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paper” but little to say about their actual operation.10 According to scholars, it was only when the 
war broke out that an immense spurt in civilian defense activity took place and many volunteers 
looked for ways they could be of use.11    
 Volunteer offices in local communities across the nation were also formed under the 
direction of the OCD.12  These local volunteer offices served as “clearing houses” for those 
wishing to volunteer and in their initial stages were known for their training of air raid 
wardens.13  Under direction of the OCD at the national level, programs such as scrap and metal 
drives, war bond campaigns, and Victory Gardens were developed to get individuals involved in 
the war efforts of their communities.  Although these programs were not directed at women, 
most of the volunteers were females.  Prior to the war, other women’s volunteers agencies 
engaged in war related activities, such as the Junior League and American Legion Auxiliary.  
These organizations designed “military style” uniforms for the women who volunteered.  The 
uniforms were a symbol to those who wore them that it was “time to stop all the useless little 
gestures, to stop being Little Women and be women.”14  It was time for women to step out of 
their homes and serve a greater purpose by aiding the war effort.  The uniform was to represent 
the “double-duty” lives of women who volunteered for the war but were also wives and mothers.  
LaGuardia was the main proponent behind the uniforms and believed they would appeal to 
women and therefore encourage them to volunteer.  The American Women’s Voluntary Services 
(AWVS), founded in 1940, had also been active in the war effort prior to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor by preparing cities for bombings and set up 350 branches across the country in the first 
two years.  Because American cities were never bombed, the AWVS became similar to the 
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Volunteer Offices in that is local branches served to place volunteers in their appropriate 
functions; both had changed their focus from civilian defense to mobilization.  By the close of 
the War, AWVS trained 325,000 women volunteers for defense efforts in the form of protection 
and service programs, such as driving ambulances and working in canteens.15     
 Due to New York’s large population, strategic Atlantic seacoast location, and large 
industrialized economy, it became a leading state in establishing programs for defense prior to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor.16  All of the state’s efforts for war production therefore began to 
increase rapidly and New York needed to create an organization system that would enable the 
local communities to take on some of the responsibility for other defense efforts.  New York 
Governor Lehman therefore organized a conference on July1, 1940 of all the city mayors. At the 
conference defense production and “social dislocation” were discussed, and Lieutenant Governor 
Charles Poletti was made the State Coordinator on National Defense in order to take some of the 
burden off of Governor Lehman.17   Throughout the summer of 1940 defense work in New York 
expanded, and the Governor requested an advisory committee to help meet the increasing needs 
of the state.  He therefore appointed a State Council of National Defense on August 1, 1940 that 
consisted of leaders from numerous industries.  According to a New York Times article, the 
formation of the council without legislative authority was an “action unprecedented in peace 
time” and its primary duty, at first, was to advise the governor on preparing for national 
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defense.18   It was not until February 20, 1941 that the council was given statutory authority with 
the passage of Chapter 22 of the Laws of 1941. 19       
The Council was originally made up of representatives of industry, labor, banking, and 
agriculture, demonstrating that New York State initially perceived its problems as economic.20 
The Governor had chosen these specific individuals because of their knowledge on how to 
increase production.21  As time passed and the council evolved in the months leading up to the 
war, its purpose evolved to educate, defend, and most importantly, mobilize the public by 
obtaining volunteers for necessary activities on the home front. Vital to the council was the 
volunteer efforts of every New York State citizen in order for all of the programs to be carried 
out efficiently.  The volunteers were expected to fulfill the social needs of their communities that 
were emerging from the upcoming war.  The Defense Council needed the local communities to 
organize, and the cities and counties soon met the requests by the state to appoint their own local 
defense councils.22  In March of 1941 the Legislature authorized the local councils by statute, 
and they were provided, within their respective jurisdictions, with “powers” that paralleled those 
of the states.  Although it is not certain what those powers actually entailed because their purpose 
was stated as to evaluate the impact of the war and promote state and national security, utilize the 
available resources, and coordinate all activities.  Although America had not entered World War 
II at this point, the increasing power of the Axis was causing some alarm across the country.  As 
1941 came to a close, more people were convinced of the inevitability of the United States’ entry 
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into the war, and according to Hartzell, support for the local councils and programs began to 
grow across New York State.23   
As of August 1941, there were three large divisions of the Defense Council: civilian 
defense (which was essentially headed by the military), women’s activities, and the production 
of war materials (which also included vocational training if need be).24 In order to carry out its 
duties, the Defense Council decided that volunteer registration bureaus needed to be established 
in the localities as a way to place people in organizations where they could use their acquired 
skills and experience.  The local defense councils were also urged to use the resources and 
organizations already available to them.  The State Defense Council did not want the local 
boards to take away manpower from pre-established organizations in their communities and 
therefore insisted they work through existing channels.   
Up to this point in time, there was little room given to women in the defense program 
because the Defense Council was concerned primarily with the protection of civilians and 
producing war materials.  For the most part, men did this type of work to meet the council’s 
concerns.  Many felt that women could play a much more important role on the home front 
because they could best understand and meet the social needs of the community during a time of 
war.  Men were primarily concerned with protecting the communities while women were seen as 
vital for gearing their neighbors to volunteer in one way or another.25 During this time period, 
many women in America were housewives whose primary role was taking care of their children 
and homes; they therefore had deep connections in their neighborhoods with the other women 
and families of the community.  Women were seen as valuable because they could be the most 
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effective tool in mobilizing their communities to volunteer.  Many of the secondary sources 
argued that the opinion held by the majority of Americans believed that if a woman was not 
employed (which was the case for many), it was her duty to devote herself to her home and 
community, which included engaging in volunteer activities.  This belief was based on the 
conventional idea that volunteering was reserved for the “appropriate sexual sphere” of 
women.26  
Governor Lehman decided on Mrs. Clarice Leavell Pennock, a former sociology and 
history teacher from Syracuse, to head the newly established Women’s Division in the summer 
of 1941.27 At two similar meeting held in  Albany on August 5th and September 8th of 
representatives of social welfare and women’s agencies from across the state, Mrs. Pennock 
announced  the main objective of the Women’s Division.  She instructed those present that its 
purpose was to help communities establish central volunteer bureaus in order to coordinate the 
efforts of programs by recruiting, classifying, and placing volunteers.  At the meetings, Governor 
Lehman emphasized four important duties of the Women’s Division: supporting emergency 
defense activities, providing the public with information about the war abroad while also 
stressing the conservation of democratic values at home, continuing social services that were 
essential for defense, and providing every citizen the opportunity to defend their own 
community.28  By creating ways for the public to volunteer in one way or another, Governor 
Lehman argued that citizen morale would only increase.  The Council advocated the idea that 
families and communities needed to ban together against weaknesses such as hopelessness or 
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indifference felt by individuals in order for America to reach her full strength.29 As stated by 
Governor Lehman, “We need wide citizen participation for the safety, health and wellbeing of 
our national life.”30  The Council also wanted to maintain the social programs which already 
existed and emphasized how each organization needed to coordinate their efforts so that no 
overlapping occurred. 31   
During this time the State Defense Council also wanted local branches to encourage the 
participation of more women on their boards because many were already part of various 
volunteer organizations that they could mobilize together.  Mrs. Pennock and the Defense 
Council called on these women to use their resources and pull women both in and outside of 
their organizations together for the common defense of the state and therefore the country.32  
Many already had the expertise and the experience and could coordinate the organizations in 
their communities so that all the resources could be utilized to make the Division successful. 
Women were therefore seen as essential by the government for establishing the volunteer 
bureaus and a focus of the Defense Council became stimulating women to volunteer.  Women 
also needed to hold positions on the local councils.  The State Council determined that these 
women had to have certain qualifications, such as knowledge of how to stimulate volunteers, 
have a wide variety of interests (and therefore not promote one particular organization over 
others), and she also had to have experience and the necessary prestige to command respect of all 
the groups.33   
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This particular meeting also outlined the essential duties of the local defense councils at 
the time.  The first of which was to train workers for defense industries (New York State had 
already trained upwards of 80,000 workers for defense industries).  Second, to protect civilians 
by creating evacuation plans, rationing food, and mobilizing police men and firefighters.  Third, 
to strengthen health facilities in case of an imminent disaster while also maintaining existing 
social agencies.  Lastly, to educate adults on how to protect their own citizenship rights.  The 
members of the meeting also left with instructions to take the plans back to their local boards for 
setting up volunteer bureaus and getting members involved in these activities.34  
By the end of fall 1941, the Division of Women’s Activities was changed to the Division 
of Volunteer Participation.35 The name of the division was changed because men were also 
called upon to volunteer, though it is important to note that most of the volunteer services were 
provided by women in their communities.  These individuals sacrificed their time for the war 
effort and were seen primarily as “volunteers” and not workers.  This was significant because 
although this Division represented a way for women to get involved in the war effort, they still 
could only fill traditional female roles.  Volunteering was a long standing role for many middle 
class women.  The fact that women were encouraged largely to volunteer also related to the 
popular belief about women in World War II.  Many early scholars argued that the war was a 
good experience in that it created new opportunities for women that changed their lives and laid 
down the foundation for future social reform.36  According to these authors, the war allowed a 
change in the attitude towards the expectations of women in society because they were able to 
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join the labor force in large numbers.  This may have been true for many of the women who 
often found themselves forced to take on jobs with the absence of a husband and his financial 
support.  A different story is seen in the efforts of the State Defense Council to get women to 
volunteer.  The Council’s emphasis on volunteering as women’s avenue for war involvement 
demonstrated how traditional attitudes about women’s role in society continued during the war.  
The Council’s efforts and eventual success (according to the Council) in stimulating women to 
volunteer revealed how the war did not transcend the conservative views about a woman’s place 
in the world which was serving their homes and communities.  In answering the call to volunteer, 
many women demonstrated their own commitment to traditional values.37    
Beginning on October 16, 1941 a two-day training institute was held in Albany that 
outlined all the ways in which the volunteers, mainly women, could serve their communities.  
This meeting was attended by the female members of the local defense councils and was 
significant because it instructed them on the State’s plans for establishing and organizing the 
volunteer offices and the procedures they were meant to carry out.38  The councils had a lot of 
work to do because they had to familiarize themselves with the existing local agencies and 
organize the volunteers based on their qualifications and experiences.  Volunteers were asked to 
help out in almost all aspects of public life and areas affected by defense mobilization, ranging 
from recreation and nursery school programs to schools and churches.  Volunteers could be used 
to combat delinquency by aiding police, becoming big brothers or sisters to troubled youth, and 
provide recreational activities to camps and defense production areas.39  Volunteers could aid 
civilian protection in case of an invasion by promoting junior safety councils and teaching fire 
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aid.  The state also called on volunteers to teach by reading stories to production workers’ 
children, coaching athletics, assisting in training programs, and instructing citizenship classes.40  
With regard to schools, volunteers could plan events for children, educate mothers, on proper 
child care, help maintain libraries, conduct art and music classes, and help with the school lunch 
programs.  Red Cross nutrition aid, canteen, and nutrition courses were also to be provided at 
local colleges.41  According to the Defense Council, it was important for national defense to have 
healthy and therefore strong individuals on the home front.  The institute also discussed ways to 
organize, finance, and train volunteers in large and medium sized cities and small towns.  
   Major General John F. O’ Ryan who dealt primarily with the protection aspect of the 
Division spoke at the conference about how the communities needed to be prepared in case of 
imminent danger by having volunteers enlist for specific emergency services, such as rescue 
squads and fire wardens. Volunteer programs on a national level, such as the U.S.O., Consumer 
Information, Salvage Programs, and the American Unity Programs also needed the help of 
volunteers.  The U.S.O. units offered ways for communities to directly give service to enlisted 
men by providing overnight shelter or aiding recreation programs.  The State Defense Council 
recommended that the localities set up Consumer Interest Committees to educate the public on 
how to “buy wisely” and not waste goods.42  This was eventually replaced by the Office of Price 
Administration (OPA) on a national level.  The purpose of the OPA was to create a system of 
rationing and price controls that directly reached communities through enlisting the help of 
female shoppers to fight inflation.43   
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Another important aspect of the institute was its focus on unifying the committee.  The 
training institute came up with ways to create unity in communities by using radio programs, 
newspapers, organizations such as labor unions, and youth based programs as a means to appeal 
to the community at large.  At the time, the council also recognized that brining communities 
together would be difficult due to the prejudice that many felt towards specific races and 
nationalities.  The council therefore encouraged the members present to try to end discrimination 
in their communities and work with foreigners and minorities by taking a different approach to 
finding out what they could learn from these various groups of people and how they could help.  
A message of the council was that such racist attitudes were a “serious stumbling block in 
achieving national unity.” 44  Communities were also encouraged to appreciate the different 
cultures and avoid accusing people of different ethnicities of anti-American feelings just because 
they were foreign born.  The Division most likely emphasized unification to demonstrate its 
dedication to the democratic ideal of equality and unity.  The Division often encouraged citizens 
to be open to and work with other races and ethnicities, though it did not usually take decisive 
action to ensure that this goal was reached.  It appeared that when the Division did promote 
unification, it was an attempt to show it had worked to transcend the racial tensions of the time 
and incorporated everyone in its mobilizations efforts.  In reality it did not do a lot to cater to the 
needs of minorities or put a large effort into making them feel part of the community.     
This significant meeting was also important for drawing the line between the division of 
civilian defense and the volunteer participation.  The Civilian Defense Division was headed by 
General John F. O’Ryan and dealt primarily with air raids, police mobilization, and auxiliary 
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services.45  The Volunteer Division had two main objectives: to motivate women to participate 
and volunteer in defense programs and establish volunteer offices for the training of all citizens.  
The Volunteer Division was to stem from the local defense councils, develop services for 
individuals with various skills, and represent the community as a whole.  These three meetings 
underscored the importance of the Division of Volunteer Participation while also educating the 
local representatives on where to place volunteers.  At this point the objective of the Volunteer 
Office seemed to encompass all areas of a community and centered on activities that were 
traditionally engaged in by women.  From the records it appeared that the office had extensive 
plans for ways to get the communities involved and therefore mobilized.  These three meetings 
highlighted the hard work that the Division had already put in to creating all the possible ways in 
which volunteers could be used.  It was evident that they anticipated large numbers of New 
Yorkers to volunteer their time for the war effort.  
It was difficult initially for the State Department and War Council agencies to reach a 
clear understanding of the actual procedures and policies they were to carry out with regards to 
the local war councils.  Some counties, especially the smaller and more rural ones, were slow to 
form their local volunteer offices.  In order to strengthen the ties between the local agencies and 
the State Division of Volunteer Participation, three subordinate agencies were established: the 
Section of Citizen Morale, the Volunteer Office, and the Section of Civilian War Services.  The 
Section of Citizen Morale was responsible for creating unity among the community; the 
Volunteer Office’s purpose was to set up and direct all the local volunteer branches; and the 
Section of Civilian War Services was in charge of the communities’ over all needs such as 
housing, nutrition, and child care.46  Around November 1941, volunteer field agents were also 
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made available to the local war councils to analyze the specific needs of communities and 
suggest ways in which they could efficiently put state programs into action.47      
According to Hartzell, in the months leading up to America’s entry into World War II, 
the morale of the defense councils was not as strong because many Americans were not quite 
convinced that their country would enter the war.  Publicity had focused too much on creating a 
sense of fear and danger in order to gain support for the defense programs; the Defense Council 
instead wanted to create a section of the Division of Volunteer Participation that emphasized the 
importance of democratic ideals to remind Americans what their country and allies were fighting 
to preserve.  The democratic way needed to prevail over the socialist Nazis and the Division felt 
that Americans had to remember why their system was the best way of life.  The Defense 
Council therefore appropriated specific funds for the creation of a Section of Citizen Morale.  
The State Council believed that the strongest defense against America’s enemies was a 
unified home front.  Beginning in 1942, plans began to take root for the development and 
formation of the new Section whose main goal was to bring all citizens together for the common 
good of the country.  A proposal was written to establish that the new section that would 
primarily deal with “people’s ideals, the issues, the goals-the morale of America in the war.”48  It 
was at this meeting that Governor Lehman appointed a Council for Citizen Unity composed of 
25 members and Union College President Dixon Ryan Fox was made the chairman.  The general 
objectives of the section was to essentially “build unity” among every type of American, help to 
spread information, and promote an understanding of war issues such as inflation, news policies, 
and American ideals over fascist teachings.49  In order to carry out these objectives, the Citizen 
Morale Council was to support group discussions on all issues dealing with the war attended by 
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as many members of the community as possible.  In order to reach out to the community, the 
local council was supposed to use forums, union meetings, and radio town meetings.  By 
utilizing these resources, the council would be able to take the national issues at hand and show 
how they related to the local labor unions or small business owners.  This way, the local councils 
could generate support for the war and develop “clear headed public opinion with strong grass 
roots in individual thinking.”50  Another way it was to promote unity was by bringing all people 
of the community together, especially minority groups, and having them participate on the war 
committees.  If instances of discrimination were discovered then all efforts were to be put forth 
to correct it and prevent it from reoccurring.   
 According to Hartzell, the Section for Citizen Unity was formed in order to awaken 
people to the threat posed by their feelings of indifferences towards what our allies were fighting 
for in Europe.  Therefore, when America did enter the war and many were in support of fighting 
democracy’s enemies, the initial need for the Citizen Unity Council no longer existed.  Although, 
the Section did continue through 1943 until it was abolished in December of that year.51  
Throughout its duration, the program did not prove very effective because there was often a lack 
of understanding among the people over what its main purpose and function was.  As described 
by Hartzell, this was often due to the fault of the Council, which “suffered from the inability…to 
phrase clearly enough for the comprehension of the average man and women just what it was 
they were driving at.”52 It appeared that the Section set out to do a lot in order to unite citizens of 
all ethnicities and origins and get them involved. In reality, the Unity Council did much more 
talking than taking direct action, and served more as a forum for providing information and 
hosting discussions on the war.  The Unity Council wanted to promote equality and inclusiveness 
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because it was part of the American ideal that was being fought for, but it did not do much to 
carry out this goal.  According to Hartzell, some people even believed that promoting such 
activities (that brought all races together) were dangerous because these could lead to “…radical 
social changes…it was thought they should be discontinued.”53  This also demonstrated that 
many of the unity programs were most likely not bought into by some Americans.               
In April 1942 the New York State War Emergency Act was passed to solidify the laws of 
the previously established Defense Council to meet the new demands of the war. To begin with, 
its title of the Council of Defense changed to the New York State War Council and it now had 
twenty members.  The act stated that the War Council was to aid the war effort by “formulating 
and assisting in the execution of plans for the mobilization and efficient utilization of the 
resources and facilities of the state.”54  The War Council was given more power in that it could 
form its own policies instead of administering existing programs. It now had the power to 
“adopt, promulgate, and make effective plans, rules, and orders with respect to any matter 
deemed by the State War Council essential to the war effort.”55  Resolutions and legislation 
passed by the War Council dealt largely with enforcing rules and regulations. The Act also 
created three main divisions in an effort to coordinate the efforts of the local war councils:  the 
Division of Civilian Protection, Division of Industry and Labor, and the Division of Civilian 
Mobilization (Figure 2.1).  All civilian protection activities and units in the State were placed 
under the direction of General Haskell, chairman of the Division of Civilian Protection. General 
Haskell was given the power to give orders to all the programs which dealt with civilian 
protection under his Division.  The purpose of the mobilization and labor divisions were to bring 
the previously defined “miscellaneous” units of their respective activities together under a single  
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 Figure 2.1: Chart of New York State War 
Council, November, 1943 
 
Source: Hartzell, Empire State at War, 294. 
 
umbrella organization.  This way the efforts of all the groups could be accounted for and 
coordinated and the programs could be strengthened.56  Under the War Emergency Act, a single 
command was created at both the state and local levels so that individual directors had command 
over their services across the state and local directors in their specific communities.  A line of 
authority was established from the state to the local governments so that the communities could 
act accordingly to state wide policies (Figure 2.1).57   
The Division of Volunteer Participation was also changed to the Office of Civilian 
Mobilization (OCM) and placed under the Division of Civilian Mobilization.58  The OCM was to  
“function as an agency of the State War Council responsible for the mobilization of citizen 
volunteers to perform duties in Civilian Protection, Civilian War Services, and other activities 
pertinent to the war effort.”59  According to the State, for the war effort to be effective, the local 
war councils had to ensure efficiency in supporting their communities’ wartime needs and 
objectives.  The local councils were supposed to be a neutral body that could direct and unify a 
community war effort without wasting resources.  The local war councils therefore had to be 
reviewed periodically by OCM field representatives to ensure that they met regularly and had an 
active membership.60 This demonstrated how the State Council was worried about the efficiency 
of home front mobilization on a local level and therefore had to work hard to ensure that the right 
measures were being taken to reach their standards.  The local Councils also had to have a 
Division of Civilian War Services to deal with the war’s impacts in their communities.  As stated 
by Mrs. Walter Scott McNabb (who took over as the Director of the OCM in the winter of 1943), 
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the Division of Civilian War Services was to provide a focal point for the community service 
programs and to coordinate all these programs as well.61  The Civilian War Services dealt 
primarily with child care, nutrition, physical fitness, youth groups, and public school education 
to determine the effects of the war on communities and try to find solutions.  The Act also 
wanted to ensure that a “central pool of volunteer manpower” was maintained in each 
community so that the council could fulfill its role.62    
The OCM reports at this time revealed that the Council experienced a lot of difficulty in 
getting the localities to understand their new responsibilities under the act; some reacted with 
“non cooperative criticism of the purpose of the war act.”63  The OCM believed that the local 
offices were poorly organized and that they needed to improve their “control and regulation” of 
the localities to make improvements in volunteer efforts.64  Many local councils were 
exceptionally slow in making new appointments for chairmen of Civilian Mobilization.  By June 
1942 the State Council believed it had given the local councils plenty of time to reorganize 
themselves and were frustrated with the slow progress. For example, Elmira was noted as a town 
that had not taken much action to establish an OCM. It still did not have a fully operated 
mobilization office by July because the town was unclear on how to organize it.65  Many locally 
appointed OCM chairmen were realizing that a large effort was required on their part to produce 
effective volunteers. Some of them were therefore replaced because their skills and energies 
were not proving efficient enough to carry out their duties. 66   The setting up of the three main 
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divisions after the passage of the War Emergency Act demonstrated how the War Council had 
become rather bureaucratic with the power it had been given. It intended to impose that power 
whenever necessary on the local councils in order to get them to reach the high expectations it 
had set for the home front.  Due to the localities’ consistent inefficiency in carrying out war 
programs, the Council often expanded its power and control over the local councils so that they 
would meet the goals of the state.   
When local councils were instructed to begin establishing Civilian War Service Sections 
under the War Emergency Act, many communities were slow to start them and were initially 
confused as to what sort of relationship the division was to have within the council itself.  The 
OCM therefore set out to ensure the efficiency of the Civilian War Service Sections of the local 
councils.  It declared in its progress reports it now had the responsibility to “service Civilian War 
Services Divisions as part of their general assignment to local war councils throughout the 
State.67  By August 1942, only 48 sections had been established throughout the state.68  Some 
reports even indicated resistance from the local councils in establishing Civilian War Service 
Sections.  For example, many rural communities believed they did not have a need for the 
specific division like the urban communities did.  They also did not clearly understand how to 
organize their community to effectively carry out Civilian War Services. 69  Such an example 
was Flexner, Ithaca, which was concerned with other activities, primarily farming and preserving 
food, and did not think a Civilian War Service section was relevant for its needs.70  The OCM 
stated how its representatives had to drive “home more forcibly” the responsibility of the local 
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councils to establish the sections.71 The Division of Civilian Mobilization therefore released a 
“Handbook of Civilian War Services” that described why the section was needed, its essential 
purpose was, its organization, the available resources, and its relationship to other agencies.  
Essentially, the Division was supposed to recognize the community’s problems, determine what 
facilities and services could be used to help fix the situations, and promote the programs to the 
community.72   It was only after the handbook was written and distributed that things became 
clearer and the program appeared to make some progress.  
In order to supervise the local divisions separately, the OCM used control charts that 
provided numbers of volunteers and where they were placed for each local council. Field staff 
also began to work more directly with the local Civilian War Services divisions.  It was apparent 
that many local councils believed that they would perform the functions of the Civilian War 
Services on their own terms without instructions from the State.  The OCM therefore 
continuously stressed to the local councils that they had to meet frequently with the Office, 
survey the conditions in their communities, and remedy any of its weaknesses in compliance 
with the state’s requirements.73  Field representatives were also instructed to make careful 
reports of the local subcommittees that had formed as part of the Civilian War Services Division 
so that the OCM could understand the specific needs of communities and take appropriate action 
to remedy them. OCM reports indicated that the local councils frequently complained over the 
great number of unrelated visits from the state agents, resulting in confusion and further 
resentment over their responsibilities.74 The OCM also expanded the Civilian War Services by 
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creating an executive committee at the local level that consisted of the chairman and three lay 
members with standing in the community.  The purpose of the committee was to divide the areas 
of need and activity of a community into the three classifications of health, community welfare, 
and education, with the each lay member the leader of one section.75  The OCM’s increased 
instruction and regulation of the local councils revealed that the communities were not 
mobilizing as efficiently as had been expected by the state.   The Office therefore had to work 
hard in order to get the local councils to follow their rules and do what was asked of them.           
On May 14, 1942 a resolution was passed by the OCM that demonstrated how women 
would play the most important role in carrying out the volunteer efforts of the state. The 
resolution was a pledge specifically for women that they had to take as volunteers during the 
War.   
We, as representatives of organized women of New York State…pledge ourselves to do 
everything within out power, individually and collectively to win the war and to prepare 
for peace, and to strengthen the organization and activities of the State, county and local 
war councils.76 
 
The oath was significant in that it was reserved specifically for women, indicating that all 
volunteer activities would be organized and taken up by the women of the local communities.  
The oath therefore implied that women served primarily to volunteer during the war.  They also 
served in the war production industries, but by studying the OCM it is clear that they were also 
important for mobilizing their neighborhoods.  The activities they engaged in allowed them to 
play a part in the war effort, although these activities were still “traditional” gendered roles for 
women.  This oath was therefore important with relation to the debate about women’s role in 
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World War II.  A popularly held belief purported by some scholars was the idea that the war had 
created advancement opportunities for women.  These opportunities allowed for society to see 
them as something other than homemakers both during and after the war.  This may have been 
true for those who joined the work force (which for many was only temporary).  In studying the 
OCM’s activities and women’s active role in volunteering to mobilize citizens on the home front, 
the compliance of women to aid the war effort through conventional means was demonstrated.  
This evidence, along with the fact that the OCM directed its efforts towards appealing to women 
to volunteer, indicated that the war did not cause a change in society’s attitudes towards 
women’s but instead reinforced its conventional views.  Therefore, the war was perhaps not so 
“good” because pre-war attitudes and practices towards women prevailed.             
Another important aspect of their oath was the women’s pledge to protect the well-being 
of all citizens regardless of race, nationality, gender, or color.  A main concern of the OCM was 
creating a unified home front; the volunteers therefore had to take an oath not to discriminate 
against specific individuals or organizations based on personal bias.  Lastly, the women pledged 
themselves to preserve the “American way of life” which meant the freedoms, liberties, and 
opportunities the county was to provide for all citizens.77  This was more to show the Office’s 
intention to honor important democratic principles.  In reality, it did not take much action to 
reach this goal of true unity.  The Office talked a lot about unifying all citizens, making 
immigrants feel welcomed, and preserving equality, although it often turned out to be an empty 
promise.  
An extension of the OCM which developed in order to deal with the issue of organizing 
communities effectively and allowed another way for women to lead volunteer efforts was the 
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Block Leader Program introduced in October 1942.78  According to Hartzell, the program was 
created in order to bring the “full strength of communities” in support of the programs.79  This 
fact indicated how the War Council felt the need to impress more power on the local councils 
because they were not meeting the hopes of the state-planners with regards to mobilization; not 
as many citizens were doing their job on the home front as was expected of them.  In order to 
carry out the Block Plan, a guide of proposed course content for the block leader training 
program was sent to the chairmen of local war councils that outlined the lessons to be taught to 
block leaders.  The manual outlined the purposes of the program and the necessary qualifications 
for a block leader.80  The objectives of these leaders were to inform their communities about 
vital war information, collect information needed for community planning, and promote 
cooperation. According to the State Council, they had to have patience, the willingness to 
sacrifice, and patriotism.81 In order to become a Block Leader, one had to go through an 
orientation of all Civilian War Services and receive instructions on community projects on how 
to be a democratic leader.  Block Leaders also had to contact all the neighbors in their sector in 
order to suggest ways they could assist in war services, educate the community on the war effort, 
and provide the war leaders with the general opinions of their communities with regards to the 
local war councils’ actions.82  The Block Leaders also conducted surveys of their blocks to find 
out information about available space for incoming workers, children who need daycare because 
their mothers were working, and women available for the war industry. It is no surprise that 
many women would come to serve as Block Leaders; they already knew their communities and 
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neighbors and were therefore ideal candidates for the program.  Serving as Block Leaders was 
another example of how women took traditional means to aid the war effort, demonstrating that 
conventional ideals were not overturned during the war to the extent that was popularly believed.  
The Block Leader also had the responsibility of promoting the Civilian War Service programs 
and provided its resources to the community.83  The training program distributed to the local 
councils also instructed Block Leaders on good methods of leadership and how to develop 
morale within their communities.84 
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Chapter 3: The Office of Civilian Mobilization Expands its Power 
An important aspect of the Block Plan programs is that it demonstrated how the OCM not 
only established these local volunteer agencies but became active in putting the programs into 
operation. In its initial stages the office was concerned primarily with establishing the volunteer 
bureaus that would be responsible for carrying out the state war programs.  The preliminary 
meetings of the Volunteer Division which eventually turned into the OCM demonstrated how the 
Office’s primary concern was creating the structures that would implement the State War 
Council’s programs and initiatives.  As the war progressed and there was a greater need for home 
front activities, a significant shift in the OCM’s objectives became to ensure that their programs 
were taking place effectively on a local level.   
With America’s entry into the war the main concern of the OCM was to establish local 
volunteer offices so that they could register and place volunteers in appropriate areas.  By the fall 
of 1942, 600 volunteer offices had been established across New York State.  The OCM had 
practically completed its task of creating the structures of these volunteer offices and began to 
transition its focus on implementing the war programs. During this time Director Mrs. Clarice 
Leavell Pennock wrote in her report to the State War Plans Coordinator that it “must increasingly 
turn its attention to efficiency and procedures in the offices.”1  This statement alone 
demonstrated that the OCM was clearly concerned that the local offices were insufficient in 
carrying out their duties and it now had to intervene directly to get volunteer efforts 
accomplished.  After establishing local war councils in the majority of counties and cities in New 
York State, it was time for the OCM to focus on ensuring that the war programs were effectively 
carried out.   From the reports it was clear that a lot of work was needed to help the volunteer 
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offices and there was mounting concerns the local councils were not executing the programs 
successfully.2  In order to do this, the office had to directly assist the volunteer organizations.  
The OCM held divisional conferences to bring specific instructions to the local war councils on 
how to establish successful Block systems and to increase the effectiveness of the volunteer 
organization and function of the Division of Civilian War Services.3  These conferences also 
served as a way for the chairmen of specific programs, such as of the Block Plans and Volunteer 
Offices, to meet and trade ideas and possible solutions to existing problems.  The OCM also 
developed a specific form to be filed out by local councils as to provide the head office with a 
“master report” of the county’s or city’s recent activity.  These reports began in January of 1943 
and were used by the OCM field staff to target specific areas of weaknesses in each locality and 
determine ways they could help to resolve them.  The OCM had to remain in constant and direct 
contact with the local councils in order to develop and maintain effective programs and “keep 
them thoroughly aware of their responsibilities under the War Emergency Act.”4  The State War 
Council depended on the efficacy of local war councils doing their job, and it was the OCM’s 
duty to ensure that they were successful.   
In May 1942, the OCM issued a memorandum requesting more funds to support a greater 
number of field staff.  In order for the office to continue to meet its responsibilities to the local 
councils and communities, it needed full time field representatives.  The OCM was trying to 
expand its reach and have more of a say on the local level. The representatives were the State’s 
direct contact with the localities and were therefore very important for carrying out effective 
programs.  At the time two of their men were on loan from the State Department of Social 
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Welfare and were about to be recalled, leaving the OCM with three field men and one director.  
The OCM requested six men in order to report on each area of the state.  Director Mrs. Winthrop 
Pennock also requested a “specialist in office management and filing methods” in order to 
organize all the Office’s records.  Lastly, two program supervisors were requested to work in 
aiding the local sections of Community War Services and other educational programs.5  These 
requests demonstrated the shift in the OCM becoming more involved with the local war councils 
because they were not living up to its expectations.  The Office’s reports from this time revealed 
how a tension between the state and local mobilization efforts existed and the State Council 
constantly pushed the localities to do more.  It also increased its scrutiny of the communities and 
in an attempt to stimulate a more efficient mobilization effort, became much more intrusive and 
controlling of what occurred on a local level. These patterns demonstrated that it took a great 
deal of effort to get the local councils to fulfill the expectations set by the OCM, indicating that 
perhaps not all communities and every citizen was willing to sacrifice their time and efforts for 
the war effort.  Mobilization efforts were therefore not that successful, especially in its initial 
stages, and the home front was not as completely unified as the state had anticipated.         
  Beginning with the official bulletins released by the OCM in the spring and summer of 
1942, one can see how the office attempted to shape the behavior of local councils by issuing 
instructions and advice and answering specific questions of individual counties.  These 
demonstrated how the OCM became more involved in the local offices in order to assess whether 
they were successfully mobilizing their communities. The local offices were clearly not doing 
their job in mobilizing their communities and the Office needed to change that.  It had set high 
expectations for New York in providing a strong and unified home front where able citizens 
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were supposed to be doing their job and contributing to the war effort.  The OCM therefore 
issued official bulletins to the chairmen of local war councils in order to convey “information, 
suggestions, and comments regarding the war job” the state was doing.6  The bulletins used 
examples of successful counties to demonstrate ways problems were solved and programs 
efficiently carried out.  They offered advice on how to organize volunteers, suggested ways 
volunteers could be put to use, and proposed significant war films that could be shown to the 
community.7  An example is in the May 22, 1942 “News Bulletin” which discussed how the 
Albany Volunteer Office used a local college to research, write, and produce a series of evening 
radio scripts to carry the Governor’s message to every home in the county.8  These examples 
were continuously used to provide models for the other cities to follow if they were to face 
similar issues. 
Monthly OCM reports to the State War Plans Coordinator also reflected the development 
of the office in attempting to ensure efficiency of war programs on a local level.  Regional 
conferences were held during July 1942 that claimed progress had been made to help local war 
councils understand the role of the Volunteer Office and be more willing to cooperate with 
civilian mobilization programs.  It is apparent that the Office had to continuously strive to get the 
local councils to work with (and therefore follow the instructions) of the state.  During this time 
the OCM also made important agreements with federal agencies that already had extensive 
organizations of their own.  This way the volunteer offices could be used to their full extent and 
there would be no duplication of specific efforts on a local level.  For example, in July 1942 the 
OCM promised to work closely with the United Sates Employment Service in order to recruit 
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workers during times of emergency agricultural shortages.9  Another example that demonstrated 
the OCM’s attempt to increase its level of control at the local levels was the system it developed 
of dispatch and timing to control when programs were released from the State to the local 
councils so that they could fully complete one duty before they were issued another. According 
to the OCM, this system eliminated much confusion that had existed among the councils while 
also making them more efficient.10  Even with these new efforts, reports still reflected a growing 
concern of the OCM that communities were showing a lack of interest in war services.  In its 
report for March 1943, the Office “had found, through recent reports, that there has crept into 
many communities a lack of interest and a general let-down in activity.”11  This was especially 
evident in the rural communities, such as St. Lawrence and Allegany, which were primarily 
concerned with farm labor instead of war services.  According to the report, They repeatedly 
demonstrated their lack of incentive to vigorously mobilize their citizens to serve their 
community and therefore did not accomplish much.12  Civilian Mobilization was clearly not as 
successful among the localities and the OCM had to continue to bear down in an attempt to get 
the results it wanted.      
By 1943 the State War Council’s primary concern was no longer focused on protecting 
civilians from immediate attack but on strengthening the communities at home.  Director Mrs. 
Winthrop Pennock believed that Civilian War Services were important to prosecuting the war at 
home more so than the protective services which had been a main focus of the State War Council 
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up to that time.13 In focusing more on social services, the role of women in the OCM’s efforts 
was elevated.   An example was the house-to-house canvass that occurred to find inactive nurses 
and encourage young women to sign up for nursing courses.  These canvasses were done by 
Block Leaders under the direction and supervision of the OCM.  The local councils compiled 
reports to demonstrate that the efforts of these groups were highly successful.14  The fact that 
canvasses were required to get individuals involved demonstrated that a large effort needed to be 
put forth in order to obtain volunteers, and it was largely the efforts of women that was required 
to make any substantial gains in mobilizing civilians.  As Block Leaders, they were instrumental 
in directly reaching out to the community and carrying out the OCM’s programs. These women 
were therefore necessary for enlisting the services of those who did participate in the home front 
activities and without them and their efforts, it is most likely that very little would have been 
accomplished with regards to mobilization.  This also goes back to the fact that there were 
important roles other than the “Rosie the Riveters” that were essential for the home front.  
Although in volunteering for the OCM in large groups, women confirmed society’s belief that 
their place was serving their homes and communities.  The war therefore did not diminish 
conventional ideals about their place and role in society.              
In order to expand its communication with the local councils and provide ways to 
develop home front morale (and therefore increase the strength of the War Council) the OCM 
developed discussion outlines and “campaigns” to be carried out in every city and town.  The 
first of such an example was the “Fighting the War at Home” program.  The program was 
designed to reach every home in all communities and “arouse active participation in an all out 
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war program, not only on the battle fronts, but on the home fronts as well-it will be as far 
reaching in its effect as the people participating make it.”15  The program was a course to be 
carried out by the local councils and served as a discussion outline of protective measures, 
salvage and financial issues effecting the prosecution of the war, and home front problems such 
as nutrition, child care, and morale.  The discussion topics were carried out through 
neighborhood group meetings that included all races and both genders. Although the discussion 
outline stated it was to include people of all races, it did not provide any guidelines or 
instructions on how to do this.  In fact, there was no indication about the kinds of people who 
went to and engaged in these discussions, further demonstrating that the OCM wanted to make it 
appear that it was putting the effort into respecting democratic principles when in reality it did 
not do much to ensure this goal was reached.      
Leaders of local organizations were to carry out the discussion programs in the 
communities and had specific duties, which included engaging the neighborhood group and 
drawing them into the discussions.16  These meetings were to be held in public facilities such as 
auditoriums or churches and were also to have a “hospitality committee” to ensure the comfort of 
the attendees and their hopeful return to the next discussion. The OCM created detailed 
instruction manuals to carry out this program that were issued to every local council.  The 
success of these neighborhood discussion groups depended largely on the discussion leaders and 
their ability to get the attendees to want to do more in their communities.  The OCM therefore 
took extensive measure in an attempt to make the program appealing to the community so that 
people would attend.  This was another example of how it continued to bear down even harder in 
specifying how local councils were to operate their programs. These facts demonstrated that the 
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Office was concerned over whether or not people would participate and how well it would be 
carried out by the local councils.  This unease and large effort on part of the OCM reflected the 
conclusion that civilian mobilization was not as effective and people were not serving the home 
front as had been expected.  When relying on the OCM reports to the State War Council, it 
appeared that the neighborhood course was received with enthusiasm and put into practice in a 
number of communities.  Its evidence for this claim is only supported by the fact that 4,589 
copies had been distributed.  The OCM also claimed the discussion program was well received 
by minority groups and poorer classes of the communities.  The OCM clearly believed that the 
program was serving its purpose-to reach every individual of the population.17 It is important to 
note that there was never any substantial evidence in these reports, such as exact numbers or 
actual lists of attendees, to support the assertion that all citizens in the community participated. 
 The OCM also wanted to preserve traditional family values and ideals and therefore 
created discussion outlines focused on ways in which mothers could be aided, especially by child 
care programs and nutrition courses, when they were out serving their communities in one way 
or another.18 State officials were concerned that the war would cause families to break apart with 
fathers, sons, or brothers away from home fighting the enemy. The discussion outlines issued by 
the OCM to be carried out by the “Fighting the War at Home” program therefore dealt primarily 
with maintaining morale in every home, more so than the other areas discussed.  They also 
believed it to be important that women felt a part of the war effort, even if they could not directly 
produce weapons or volunteer their time.  The OCM created a specific discussion outline 
directed towards women who remained at home during this time reminding them that their job 
was important for the war.  The discussion emphasized that homemakers dealt with numerous 
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tasks, such as budgeting, cooking, and most importantly, educating their children.  The OCM 
wanted to convey the idea that women who remained at home were just as significant as those 
working in the factories, and it was important that they knew it.19   
The second discussion emphasized how women workers were also very important during 
these troubling times.  They were vital for producing the war materials necessary for an Allied 
victory.  With so many men fighting the war themselves, women were called on to fill in their 
shoes.  These discussions therefore were important for letting women know what they could 
expect to get paid, how they would be trained, and the availability of child care programs for 
working mothers.20 Another important focus of these discussions was the preservation of 
democratic principles.  New Yorkers were taught that World War II was a “total war” that 
impacted everyone in one way or another and that democracy was to “arise and shine in every 
community.”21  The OCM conveyed the idea that democracy was under attack and it was every 
civilian’s responsibility to preserve their way of life against their enemies.  From these 
discussions it is evident that the Office wanted to convey ideals which it believed were important 
for fighting the war.  This meant making women feel included in an effort that historically 
involved the sacrifice of men (for the most part) and people aware of the threat to their county’s 
political ideology.  It was these discussions, according to the OCM’s assessments, which were 
significant for inspiring people to unite and volunteer their efforts.  The fact that the OCM 
needed to create these discussions showed that not many people were participating to the extent 
the state had anticipated.  If the State felt that people needed to be reminded of why their 
contributions were necessary and that there was a real threat to democracy, than mobilization 
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efforts were most likely not as well received and citizens were not engaging in them to the extent 
that had been hoped. 
The War Council also worked hard to educate the public by providing films for local 
councils to show to their communities.  In preparing the state for the Allied invasion of France in 
June 1944, the State Council held a conference for the local chairmen to attend.  The meeting 
provided the city officials with important films which were to gain support for the Allied 
invasion of Normandy by the civilian population.22  The program as a whole, entitled “The War 
Council and its Community,” provided films that were similar to what the Council had been 
pushing on the communities all along.  For example, some films instructed women how to cook 
efficiently, communities how to salvage war materials, and every citizen on the importance of 
keeping military information a secret.  Other war films included encouraging working mothers to 
place their children in day care facilities that “facilitated healthy development.”23  They also 
demonstrated the dangerous threat posed by Germany and Japan in an effort to show how hard 
civilians would have to work together and with America’s allies in order to defeat the enemy.  
These films reiterated the OCM’s concern that citizens were not participating and attempt to 
appeal to more people to get involved in volunteer efforts. 
Through regional conferences held in January 1943 to determine the progress of local 
War Councils, the OCM discovered that a main problem that many communities were facing 
was juvenile delinquency.24 This was not only a problem seen in New York.  The war was 
impacting all communities across the nation and effecting family life, often disrupting or even 
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destroying marriages.25  The OCM was especially concerned with preserving traditional family 
values, which was reflected in many of the discussion outlines, some of which, for example, 
were geared towards instructing women how to take care of their children while fulfilling their 
new war time responsibilities.26  Numerous wartime circumstances caused problems of juvenile 
delinquency and sexual promiscuity to become a national concern.  The absence of fathers and 
husbands put strains on the loved ones left behind.  This, when combined with the fact that many 
households were headed by women who had to now both work and deal with household duties, 
took its toll on children and led to many of them departing from the “norms” of society. For boys 
this may have meant rebelliousness or small violence and for girls sexual promiscuity, all 
activities that represented the dangerous impact of the war on old standards.27 
  In order to distract the youth from less “wholesome” activities, the OCM instructed the 
local councils to form “Youth Service Councils.”  These councils were composed of individuals 
aged 16 to 25 and provided means for youth to be involved in their community service programs 
and the war effort.  The council was also supposed to represent the various youth groups of the 
community, such as the Boy Scouts or Y.W.C.A.28  Under the OCM, a Junior Citizens Service 
Corps was also formed during this time which allowed for Federal recognition of the boys’ and 
girls’ efforts in their communities.  To be a part of the corps, one had to provide one hour of 
community service a week.29  The corps focused on war time community services, such as 
collecting scrap materials, making war materials to be used in Service Men’s Centers (such as 
bulletin boards and ping pong paddles), and sorting through donated materials as well.  The 
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Junior Citizens Service Corps were also instructed to welcome new families to towns, volunteer 
in hospitals, and assist in the care of small children of working mothers.30  The needs of youth in 
war time were also met by the OCM Victory Corps program.  Formed in high schools across the 
state, the program’s purpose was to enlist upperclassmen from high schools for civilian war 
services.   The Volunteer Office could therefore request the service of young teens through the 
Victory Corps where their specific service was needed.31  These programs represented ways the 
OCM attempted to get the youth of New York involved in the war effort and keep them from 
falling into dangerous paths that would alter the fabric of society.  From the reports it can be 
concluded that these efforts to prevent juvenile delinquency were not all that effective.  Problems 
persisted throughout the war and needs of youth in war time were consistently cited as issues 
effecting the volunteer offices.   
Geneva and Syracuse were among the cities reporting problems with juvenile 
delinquency.  Miss Scotia Ballard, executive secretary of the Council of Social Agencies, 
summarized the problems that currently faced the youth, which largely had to do with female 
delinquency.  She brought up an example of how many young girls were typically attracted to 
men in uniform, leaving out the boys their own age. There were other types of “delinquency” 
such as crime in the local communities. Very young girls were found “frequenting night clubs 
and taverns and promiscuous and loose relations resulting with men in uniform.”32 Ms. Ballard 
therefore suggested that more recreational activities be held to encourage young teenage girls to 
interact with boys the same age rather than being tempted by older military men.33  The OCM 
believed that conservative values needed to remain a consistent part of life, even during a time of 
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war. A committee was therefore formed to meet the needs of youth in wartime, known as the 
“Social and Delinquency Problems of Youth” in June 1943.  In a report submitted by the 
committee to the OCM, it recommended that communities create organized groups with adult 
supervision that would allow teens to engage in recreational activities and that buildings (such as 
schools) needed to be made available for such activities.34  The council also stressed the 
importance of maintaining a high standard of education by showing documentary films and also 
allowing the children to organize their own recreational activities (under parental supervision).  
Parents were also encouraged to attend “Guidance Clinics” held in their communities by the 
local council to educate them on how to successfully keep their child out of trouble and 
presented ways in which other cities had effectively eliminate youth delinquency.35   
The OCM was especially concerned with ensuring that girls and women remained loyal 
to the moral standards of the time.  The committee suggested ways to enforce the legal drinking 
age because it was evident that girls under the age of 18 were being served liquor and attending 
bars.  It therefore recommended that at least two police women be employed in each city to 
supervise these bars and enforce the law.  The panel recommended that girls 15 years or younger 
be escorted by an older family member if she was out after 10 o’clock p.m.  It was also 
recommended that police forces patrol their local parks on a regular basis, churches offer 
religious education  and courtship courses for high school students, and service men 25 years or 
older be prohibited from recreation activities/centers which were unable to serve alcoholic 
beverages.36  It is clear from the panel’s reports that the New York State OCM was very 
concerned with maintaining moral standards even during a time of war.  The OCM was 
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discomforted by the fact that young women were stepping outsides the bounds or propriety and it 
wanted to preserve the traditional way of life.  In fact, many communities nationwide during the 
war adjusted their law enforcement practices to address the so called “teen-age troubles.”37   For 
example, they had youth curfews and laws mandating parental responsibility for the actions of 
their children.  Extensive measures were taken to induce conformity to laws with regards to 
young girls.  Some official programs, such as the wartime sexual protection program, were intent 
on preventing female “sexual delinquency” and safeguarding public morals and health.  It 
suggested ways local laws could be changed so that women and girls who behaved in a suspect 
manner would be apprehended or turned over to juvenile courts.38 The OCM’s efforts to 
maintain conventional ideas and standards reflected the same concerns of the national 
government.  Officials wanted pre war concepts about family life, youth, and especially women, 
to continue during a changing time period.  The efforts of the OCM to preserve conservative 
values demonstrated that the war did not allow for a change in society’s attitude towards women 
but actually caused a backlash where their liberty, specifically their sexual freedom, was limited.      
The most important development of the Division of Civilian War Services was the Block 
Leader Program.  Many of the programs created by the Civilian War Services relied on the 
support of all New York households in order to be successful, and the block leader program 
provided a means for a direct connection between the households and the Council.39  The OCM 
was instrumental in establishing the Block Plans throughout the state by appointing chiefs in 
each city and organizing the block leaders.  A significant aspect of the Block Leader Program 
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was that by November 1942, approximately 90% of the leaders were women.40  The program 
was important for the women of New York because it served as one of the premier ways for 
them to be involved in the war effort.  It is true that women did work in the war production 
plants, but for the majority of homemakers the Block Program was instrumental in providing a 
way for them to become involved with home front mobilization.  The regional conferences held 
in early 1943 by the OCM also instructed the local councils how to organize the Block Plan, 
carry out important programs by means of it, and presented a Block Leader Training Course.  
The Civilian War Service Sections had not been set up in every county and the conferences were 
held in order to push the local councils to take more action in setting them up correctly.  The 
OCM was still pushing for people and communities to participate at this time because it was not 
seeing successful mobilization on a local level.   
The OCM also took the time to investigate the success of the Block Leader Program in 
individual counties and looked for various ways it could be used, demonstrating another example 
of how the Office wanted more control over the localities.  For example, the Army had requested 
the use of the OCM to recruit female volunteers for an auxiliary branch of the armed services 
known as the Women’s Army Corps (WAC).  In June 1943, the OCM therefore planned a state 
wide campaign for Block Leader Services to obtain the names of those individuals interested. 
The Block Leaders were instrumental for the campaign, which ended up recruiting 1,715 
potential candidates.41  OCM field staff often interviewed local councils to determine activities 
where Block Leaders could be used.  The Office would issue out memorandums directing the 
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localities on the areas it needed to focus on.42 This use of Block Leaders was also more of a 
“responsive mechanism” because it allowed for a direct connection from the State to the local 
communities and was therefore very important to the OCM.  The Office wanted to make sure 
that the program was carried out and established effectively.         
Another program that was initiated by the OCM which demonstrated its involvement at 
the local level dealt with the creation of the Child Care Committee.  On a national level, child 
care had been a controversial topic as more women began to enter the work force during the 
War.  Some groups, such as the United States Children’s Bureau, did not support child care 
programs because they did not think it was in a child’s best interest to be cared for by someone 
other than its mother.  The Bureau argued that mothers belonged at home with their children and 
pushed for government policy that defined motherhood as a patriotic service in itself. With the 
demands of the war on the defense industries in America, those concerned with meeting the 
needs of the war supported child care programs that would allow women to join the workforce.43 
With the labor shortage experienced as men left for the war, women workers were in high 
demand.  The debate focused on whether or not a woman’s duty to her family was more 
important that her civic duty.  Some defense contractors, such as Curtis-Wright in Buffalo, 
opened day care centers for their employees and the government’s campaign to recruit women 
for war production industries publicized available child care centers.44  Supporters of keeping 
mothers at home seemed to influence the national government’s programs for children because 
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the child care programs that grew out of this need to mobilize women workers were never able to 
fully meet the demands of working mothers and their children.45   
What did result was the passing of the Lanham Act in 1941, which served to help meet 
the needs of areas experiencing increased migration from the demands of the defense industries 
by providing funds for construction projects, such as for schools or roads.  The Lanham act had 
many deficiencies that made it insufficient to meet the needs of communities with increased 
numbers of working mothers.  For example, the application process for funds was cumbersome 
and there was not an effort to ensure the child care facilities were adequate.  The centers 
themselves often had high fees, short hours, and were inconveniently located.  Nevertheless, the 
Lanham Act was used by many communities to gain the necessary funds for the child care 
programs that were successfully established.  
In New York State, the OCM did not agree with the opinions of the Children’s Bureau 
and decided to try and meet the needs of its working mothers.  On June 23, 1943, a child care 
program was created under the direction of Mrs. Pennock and the OCM.46  The purpose of the 
committee was to help the local councils obtain the funds necessary to develop community 
programs to deal with child care problems.  It was very evident by this time that many women, 
especially those with children, were employed in the numerous war production factories 
throughout the state.  For example, in July, 1942 Buffalo, which had defense contractors that had 
already opened up child care centers, conducted an experimental survey in order to determine the 
needs for additional child care facilities.  It was discovered that there was a lack of agreement in 
the community over the needs of child care and different ideas about how to resolve them.  The 
survey’s purpose was to determine population density, female population (for a possible labor 
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supply), child population, and income groups.47  The survey demonstrated that eighty percent of 
the women in Buffalo were employed in 30 of the 284 plants and that an additional 64,000 
workers would be needed in the next six months, fifty percent of which were to be women.  
From June to September 1942, there was a fifty percent increase in employed mothers in upstate 
New York alone.  The State War Council knew it had to help the working mothers of New York 
if they were going to serve in the factories and help meet the demands for an allied victory.  
After the survey was conducted in Buffalo, the Child Care, Development, and Protection 
Committee, which was a part of the Civilian War Services Section of each local council, was to 
add an individual to periodically conduct the surveys to evaluate, issue recommendations, and 
create more facilities or programs to try and meet the needs of the working women.   
 In order to handle the child care problems in the communities, the Committee encouraged 
using the Lanham Act in order to gain access to Federal funds for child care facilities.  A 
memorandum was therefore composed by the OCM and distributed to the school 
superintendents, public welfare commissioners, and local Child Care, Development, and 
Protection Committees.  The memorandum’s purpose was to instruct local communities how to 
apply for the Lanham Act funds for child care facilities.48  The Federal funds were available only 
to those communities that had defense industries and were to be used for day care facilities for 
children of working mothers.  The available funds were supposed to supply, staff, and organize 
the facilities when the costs could not be provided locally.  The types of projects to be funded by 
the Lanham Act were day care facilities for nursery schools, day nurseries, and before/after 
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school programs for children aged 5 to 16 years old.49  In establishing these facilities, the 
projects had to be sponsored by the local board of education or the local department of welfare.  
It was left up to the local Child Care, Development and Protection Committee to determine the 
child care needs of specific communities by employing a survey like that used in Buffalo.   Once 
the survey was conducted the committee formed a plan to be sent to the State Committee.  If the 
State agreed with the plans, the appropriate application forms had to be filled out and then the 
funds would directly be transferred to the local committees.50 
 By October, 1942 the Child Care Committees had trained 3000 child care aides and 
distributed bulletins advertising the program.51  The OCM worked to promote and publicize the 
child care programs through the use of magazines and state newspapers.  Problems soon 
occurred because the application process for the federal funds through the Lanham Act proved 
difficult to complete.  Reflecting the controversy over child care programs at the national level, 
there was a general lack of agreement with regards to needs and varying ideas about what should 
be done among many communities.52 There were also disputes among the local councils about 
alternative options to building child care facilities, and suggestions arose such as to keep the 
schools open longer for children with working mothers.53  Another dispute was over the fact that 
too much of the emphasis had been on nursery schools and not enough on elementary aged 
children; many officials wanted to integrate recreational activities with the child care programs.  
According to minutes from OCM meetings, the office had many problems getting the 
applications approved by the Workers Progress Administration (which processed the 
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applications) because of the limitations set by the agency.54   It appeared that the OCM had a 
poorly organized Child Care program because it had difficulties preparing the applications and 
determining which areas met the qualifications for the grants.  Many communities reported their 
dissatisfaction with the process for acquiring funds and believed that Lanham grants should have 
been made for the state and then given to the communities.55  By the beginning of 1943, it was 
felt that the committee under of the OCM was not fulfilling its duties and that there were too 
many coordination problems.  The State War Council decided to abolish the committee and 
created an official State Committee on Child Care, Development, and Protection that was 
appointed by the Governor.56    
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Chapter 4: Schenectady County: An Exemplary Local War Council 
According to Hartzell, the “vast majority of New Yorkers eagerly and anxiously did what 
they could to help win the war. When it came to the test, the democratic microcosm [the State 
War Council] proved sound.”1  What truth was there to this claim? The OCM’s literature 
claimed success on nearly every front and was very involved in the local communities.  Clearly 
this did not necessarily mean that the OCM was effective in getting entire communities to 
participate in their programs.  In the beginning, it appeared that many of the offices that had been 
established were “paper organizations” that were not very efficient.2 The success of the 
mobilization programs depended largely on the efforts of the officials and chiefs of the local war 
councils; their effectiveness therefore varied from city to city.   
A county which played an important role in New York’s war effort and proved rather 
successful in mobilizing citizens was Schenectady.  Located in Upstate New York about 30 
minutes outside of the Capital, Schenectady (an area with about four percent of the State’s 
population) played a principal role in producing war materials due to the fact that both General 
Electric (G.E.) and the American Locomotive Company (A.L.C.O.) were located there.  
Schenectady was one of the first counties to take the initiative in preparing for the war by 
forming a local Citizens Committee on National Defense in the summer of 1940.3  The 
Committee was used on numerous occasions as a model to other counties in developing the State 
War Council’s programs, particularly those of the Office of Civilian Mobilization and Civilian 
War Services. 4  According to the OCM reports, the majority of local councils were ineffective in 
meeting the expectations of the State War Council and carrying out its programs.  However, 
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Schenectady demonstrated that the O.C.M.’s programs did see success in certain counties, 
especially because it had taken many measures on its own without the state’s intervention.  This 
initiative and success on a local level was not common and Schenectady was the exception rather 
than the rule for how local councils acted throughout the war.  The Schenectady War Council 
revealed that the OCM’s efforts did not go to waste and some counties did strive to serve the war 
effort.       
By the spring of 1941, the Schenectady County local Defense Council was leading the 
way in meeting the war time needs on the home front.  Within a year of its establishment, the 
county had registered more than 15,000 volunteers at the Volunteer Office of Civilian 
Mobilization.  As stated in the Schenectady Union-Star,  
The County War Council has been widely recognized as one of the most active and best 
organized in the state.  The methods used in organizing and developing many of its war-
time activities have been recommended by state war council agencies as models for other 
communities.5   
 
On December 11, 1941, immediately after Pearl Harbor, the Volunteer Office was established in 
Schenectady with the chairman, Mrs. Patrick Garey, appointed as head of the committee.  The 
physical set up of the office was commended in its early stages as well organized in a 
businesslike manner.  The office’s location, the Proctor Arcade, was central in downtown 
Schenectady and close to both G.E. and A.L.C.O.  By March of 1942, Schenectady offered a 
number of training courses provided by the OCM for its volunteers on nutrition, child care, 
civilian protection, and much more.6  These courses taught individuals how to meet the health 
needs of their families and neighborhoods, salvage food, handle crises, and train individuals in 
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child care.7  Schenectady had its own innovations as well, such as a job-evaluation committee to 
assess whether the volunteers were being used for appropriate tasks.  The county also had its 
own volunteer manual to provide instructions for training workers, define the responsibilities of 
specific committees, and standardize the practices of the local office.8  The State OCM Manual, 
monthly report forms, and other material that was designed to help local councils establish and 
maintain successful volunteer offices were built off of Schenectady’s material.9  There are 
numerous accounts where the local war council in Schenectady was praised for its work and 
efficiency.  After State officials visited the city to report on its progress, OCM director Mrs. 
Pennock wrote a letter to Schenectady expressing the State’s appreciation for the county’s 
efforts.  Mrs. Pennock said there were many aspects of the system in Schenectady, such as its 
Volunteer Office’s supportive relationship with the Office of Civilian Protection, which the State 
Office found to be exceptional and useful for other struggling communities.10   
      The OCM also singled out Schenectady for its successful public relations strategy.  
The Council worked closely with churches, school officials, and the local newspapers for 
publicity.11 According to the OCM, these relationships were necessary for a War Council to be 
successful.  From the outset, Schenectady had a very detailed and organized publicity plan where 
the two main newspapers, the Schenectady Gazette and Union Star had the responsibility of 
publishing information on the day of the week at specific times of the month, such as the 
numbers of enrolled peoples and their responsibilities, descriptions of training classes, and aims 
of the OCM.12  The newspapers were also important for advertising the needs of the volunteer 
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office and how citizen participation remained a constant necessity. By the fall of that year, the 
Schenectady papers were praising the work of the OCM for putting forth up to 700 hours of 
work individually and described how the OCM was working to educate the youth of the city.    
As early as the fall of 1941, local newspapers were publicizing the purpose of the New 
York State War Council and focused largely on the efforts of women during the war and the 
need in general for women to participate.  Women were to maintain the social health of the 
community and teach each other how to build up their neighborhoods to “give the soldiers 
something worth defending.”13  First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, in her role as head of the national 
Division of Volunteer Participation, even made her way to Schenectady where the newspapers 
carried her message that there was an important place for the home maker during a time of war.  
If they were unable to participate in the volunteer efforts, then it was their duty to maintain a 
healthy home life.14 The First Lady expressed the belief that it was their responsibility to focus 
on home nursing, first aid, nutrition, and budget management.  The First Lady also urged 
individuals to maintain morale and to always put the community’s interest ahead of their own. 
The papers also tried to appeal to the patriotic spirit of these women and emphasized that those 
who did participate truly believed in a democratic victory.15  The most important purpose of the 
papers was to advertise to the women of Schenectady ways in which they could volunteer their 
efforts for protective services, emergency welfare, the rationing board, and nurses’ aides.  They 
always carried a message that enrolling to volunteer was a step closer to victory.16   
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A specific example of how the local newspapers publicized OCM efforts was during 
Civilian Mobilization Week.  During the week of September 21, 1942, Schenectady County held 
specific events to both celebrate the work done by the local War Council and emphasize the need 
for increased enrollment of volunteers.17  The week consisted of school programs, radio 
addresses, athletic shows, community talks, and merchant window displays.  Talks were also 
given in classrooms based on a government booklet that was distributed to all children titled 
“What Can I Do?” The events of the important week were publicized in the Schenectady Gazette 
alongside an ad which asked what they were doing for the war.  The ad also said that there was a 
job for everyone who had the time to spare and that “it is the patriotic duty of every man and 
woman to do everything possible for our country and our community in this time of strife when 
the very existence of our nation is at strike.”18     
Schenectady County also used the radio as a means of communicating important OCM 
information to the public.  Radio programs appealed to individuals to enlist in the Block Leader’s 
plans and volunteer in any way possible.19  These broadcasts described the work being done and 
the future plans of specific committees and according to reports, often received a very positive 
reaction from listeners.  Some of Schenectady’s radio programs were even distributed to other 
local war councils to be used in their broadcasts.  One of these focused on drawing on the 
listener’s patriotic spirit by beginning the broadcast describing the attack on Pearl Harbor and 
America’s heroic response.  From the broadcast’s transcript one can see that it was dramatic, 
featured emotional music, and attempted to inspire in its listeners a desire to volunteer.  This 
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broadcast was even requested by Mrs. Pennock to be used by other cities. 20   The fact that 
Schenectady created a radio broadcast that was not only popular within its own community but 
used with others as well was an example of how the county was an innovative leader in 
mobilization efforts.   
One of the programs initiated in Schenectady County which was the first of the kind in 
the state was the recruiting and training of volunteers for the W.P.A nursery schools.  This began 
in July, 1941 and served as a proving ground for other counties.  Any of the problems 
encountered with the experiment were used to “shed light” on better methods for similar projects 
in New York.21  According to the training program’s report, there was a shortage in regular 
nursery school employees and securing volunteers became a primary objective.  The Nursery 
School Advisory Committee therefore reached out to the Junior League and Young Married 
Women’s Club and advertised in the local papers in order to attain the volunteers that were fit for 
the position of caring for young children.  The people who volunteered from the ads in the paper 
turned out to be the most reliable because they largely had a teaching background and therefore 
had something to add to the program.  The training entailed a two-week intensive program where 
ten hours of observation-participation in nursery schools was followed by the distribution of 
materials and discussions.22  From the “Schenectady experience” important points were taken: 
programs had to be appealing to volunteers that need to be supervised, motivated, and made to 
feel appreciated for their efforts in order to enlist their services.  The training program was also 
most likely initiated in Schenectady due to the fact that many women were already working at 
war production plants of G.E. and A.L.C.O and needed child care that was not yet supported at a 
state level.  
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Schenectady County’s recreation committee also demonstrated how the city made the 
OCM’s objectives effective on a local level.  The Schenectady Recreation Committee was under 
the leadership of Frank Callahan and was commended for “translating into local action the ideas 
which are developing in the State Advisory Recreation Committee.”23  A meeting held by the 
committee was attended by a State official who reported that the committee demonstrated the 
right methods to use in trying to carry out the state’s objectives, overcome local problems, and 
secure positive results.  At the specific meeting, a subcommittee attended which brought in a 
report that determined there needed to be a greater use of school facilities in numerous 
communities for recreational activities.  For example, a swimming pool was not being used 
because it needed repairs and nothing was being done to fix it.  A resolution was therefore 
reached at the meeting where the Recreation Committee would bring the information from the 
report to the mayor and also request a meeting of the School Board and Superintendent.  The 
same letter containing the committee’s concerns was also sent to the City Manager, press, and 
Mayor.24  From these records it would appear that the County was very thorough in ensuring that 
the War Council carried out its duty to the best of its ability.   
Upon the one year anniversary of the creation of the Schenectady County Volunteer 
Office of Civilian Mobilization, the council began to release monthly bulletins in order to 
provide the community with important news and information about the county’s war activities.  
From these reports one can gather the specific triumphs of and important roles played by the 
local council.  By November, 1942 Schenectady County’s salvage record was 167 pounds per 
capita putting it on the Government’s “Honor Roll Performance.”25  Schenectady was also 
                                                 
23 Mr. Campbell, “Letter to Mr. Grout,” July 12, 1945, Folder 54, Box 9, A3084, NYSWC.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Thomas Hanigan, Schenectady County War Council News Bulletin, November 30, 1942, Folder 50, Box 9, 
A3084, NYSWC.  
recognized for “going over the top” in its war activities through the amount of war bonds 
purchased.  It even received the United States Treasury flag as recognition for its efforts.26  The 
County was also very successful in maintaining the efficiency of its volunteers.  If volunteers 
were unable to be reached for service they were put on an “inactive list,” making it easier to 
determine which volunteers were still available for service.  The Bulletin also included 
information about important events held by specific sub committees of the Schenectady County 
Council.  For example, the Physical Fitness Committee housed one of the largest track and field 
events in 1943 at Union College.  The event hosted 750 high schools that were invited to its 
campus in the northeast to highlight the importance of physical fitness of the youth in the county.  
The Bulletins demonstrated that Schenectady also had an impressive volunteer enrollment with 
15,181 individuals enrolled within two years of the local council’s operation.27  The county also 
received high praise for establishing a local Emergency Welfare Center.  The plan was the first 
one to receive approval at the state level and copies of it were distributed to other communities 
as an example of a sufficient outline for providing welfare services during an emergency.28  
Schenectady County piloted the OCM’s Section for Citizen Morale (which eventually 
turned into the Section for Citizen Unity).  Ryan Fox, Union College President, was named 
chairman of the New York State War Council for Citizen Morale on March 18, 1942.29 
Schenectady was the “principal demonstration center” that had been working to achieve three 
special objectives: bringing together the resources of the community (meaning the War Council, 
civic agencies, youth council), reaching everybody in the community through holding 
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community discussions (64,000 people attended these meetings in Schenectady in 1942), and 
combining in one agency the task of educating and unifying the community.30  That year 
Schenectady held 99 broadcasts, 941 meetings, and 564 speeches.  The Speaker’s Bureau of the 
Citizen Unity Committee in Schenectady was responsible for bringing in guest speakers, holding 
discussions and lectures, and showing war related motion pictures. According to the county’s 
records, the Bureau worked with Polish, Italian, youth, and religious groups as well.  Relying on 
the county’s records, this process represented just one aspect of how well organized and effective 
the Citizen’s Unity Committee was in carrying out its duty to the people of the county.   
They types of discussions hosted by the Speaker’s Bureau dealt with a wide range of 
areas such as home front defense, international problems, consumer information, and social 
problems. The strengths and weaknesses of discussion panels were also evaluated to ensure their 
technique was sufficient by analyzing the manner in which they proceeded.31  This was another 
example which demonstrated the thoroughness of the Schenectady War Council.  In order to 
procure specific speakers, the bureau had to compile a list of specific topics to be discussed, such 
as youth delinquency in war time, and send out letters to organizations and groups asking for 
trained individuals to host the discussions.  In one year the Speaker’s Bureau provided 290 
different organizations with trained speakers; this meant that the local agencies often had to work 
closely with the bureau.32  These organizations included Parent-Teacher Associations, religious 
groups, and the League of Women Voters.33  In order to maintain an effective communication 
network with the local organizations, a contact group of 55 women was created that issued 
questionnaires to the groups. These questionnaires provided basic information about the 
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organizations, such as size and nature, and were used by the contact group to suggest war films, 
speakers, and panel discussions to the groups.  This process represented another way in which 
the Council strove to be an effective and sufficient war council.     
The Citizen Unity Committee also had the responsibility of showing war films to 
Schenectady County.  In one year 60 films were arranged for various organizations and the 
public as well where 11, 325 individuals attended.34  A subcommittee was formed on war 
information films in the summer of 1942.  The purpose of the committee was to organize as 
many showings as possible before organizations, schools, and the public in general.  The films 
were provided by the New York State Office of War Information and were supposed to make 
things “more realistic to the average citizen and to make him more aware of what is involved in 
the war effort.”35  The other essential purpose of the sub-committee was to encourage theater 
managers to show both short and full length films for the general public to attend depicting the 
progress of the war. The Citizen Unity Sub-committee on War Information Films also endorsed a 
new experiment in Schenectady that was a special series called “Film Forums.”  These programs, 
sponsored by the Schenectady Public Library and local Y.M.C.A., consisted of a film being 
shown and then a discussion taking place afterwards under the direction of a trained leader.  In 
order to inform the public when and where these occasions took place, the Committee also 
advertised on the radio and in the local newspapers.36  The fact that the Committee had help from 
other local organizations, newspapers, and a local college demonstrated that a large effort was 
required on numerous parts of the community to effectively carry out mobilization programs.  It 
also demonstrated how the Schenectady War Council put in the time and effort to make these 
programs a success.    
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The committee also worked with Union College to show films in the campus’s Old 
Chapel building.  Eleven programs were shown on the campus and were put on solely because of 
the efforts of the faculty who took care of many of the technical difficulties.  Union’s student 
newspaper, The Concordiensis, advertised for the series which took place on a weekly basis from 
February through April in 1943.  The paper’s coverage usually consisted of a small 
advertisement listing the films being shown and stating that they were being presented in 
compliance with the Citizen Unity Committee of the Schenectady County War Council.37  For 
example, in publicizing the College’s last showing of war information films, the advertisement 
gave a brief description of the film titled “Towards Unity” as showing people all over the word 
working and playing together, demonstrating that everyone shared similarities and that there was 
no need for racial prejudices in a time of war.38  This specific showing also reiterated a main 
concern of the State War Council to try and bring the entire community together and rise above 
racial differences.  The Schenectady Council had actually taken action to fulfill the OCM’s 
initiative to create racial harmony among the localities.  However, showing films did not 
necessarily mean they were effective or well received in unifying the community.  There was 
never any evidence in the county’s records that the films drew in a multi-racial audience or 
actually brought people together.   
The Schenectady Citizen Unity Committee also attempted to bridge the gap between the 
ethnic divides through its radio programs. Many of these programs were more informational and 
provided important war information to the community instead of promoting patriotic zeal as a 
way to get people to volunteer. An example was a discussion series titled “Speaking of Slavs” 
and was initiated by the Poles, Czechs and Slovaks in Schenectady.  The series aimed at boosting 
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the morale of 40,000 individuals of Slavic origin in the county and surrounding area during a 
time when their homeland was being attacked by the Nazis, and to educate everyone else about 
Slavic people and try to bring about “good-neighborliness.”39  This discussion reinforced the fact 
that Schenectady was an exemplary council for trying to make immigrants feel like they were a 
part of the war effort as well and that their homeland was important to America.   
Throughout 1942, the Schenectady Unity Committee endorsed numerous special events 
that catered to the specific groups of the community.  For example, the committee sponsored the 
National Negro Youth Victory Day Program.  On December 4, a Consumer Housewives’ 
Institute was held which included women from 527 women’s organizations. In April the 
Committee provided the speaker and publicized an all day institute on “Women on The Home 
Front” which was hosted by the Schenectady chapter of National Council of Jewish Women.40  
This institute reflected the views of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt in her visit in February 1942.  
The First Lady had stressed the importance of women who were primarily homemakers in 
defense of the country.  She discussed with the local council members how defense work 
provided an “outstanding opportunity for strengthening organized social service work.”41  The 
institute’s purpose was to make women feel that volunteering was important for the war effort 
and reinforced the ideology promoted by the War Council that women needed to focus on social 
services.  In promoting volunteering as the avenue to serve the war, the OCM hoped to maintain 
conventional attitudes about women, and the Schenectady Council participated in that 
promotion.    
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That fall Schenectady also hosted a three day conference on civilian participation and war 
aims where 200 group leaders attended from the Capital Region.  The conference’s title was 
“War Goals and Local Responsibility” and was held at Union College.  Its purpose was to train 
speakers and group leaders and to figure out the best ways to prevent disunity in the community.  
The conference allowed for general discussions about mobilizing civilians, building unity among 
the community, and conveying the country’s war aims to the public.42  The conference was also 
held because the Committee believed that it had to improve its job of unifying the communities 
and wanted to find better vehicles for promoting unity.  From the conference emerged two 
important recommendations: a resolution supporting a stronger citizen unity program and a 
resolution calling for the development of a commission on war goals.  According to the reports, 
“labor, racial and nationality groups were strongly represented…the vitality of the discussion 
was in considerable part traceable to the able representation of many viewpoints and interest.”43 
The fact that Schenectady hosted the conference demonstrated that it was a leader among the 
local councils in understanding its responsibility for the war effort and promoting unity in its 
own county.  
A significant aspect of the Citizen Morale Committee in Schenectady was its close 
relationship with the Schenectady Civil Youth Council (SCYC).  The Council was under the 
direction of Richard Hallahan and was composed of the young adults of the county.44  The 
SCYC was unique in that it allowed for young people to get involved in the war effort through 
their own organization.  The SCYC even published its own news bulletin for the community 
prior to America’s entry into the War.  The establishment of the SCYC demonstrated that the 
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youth in the county wanted to be involved in the community during a time when opportunities 
were developing for their active participation.  Its first issue in October, 1941 outlined the 
council’s objectives and aims, which were to train its members for “active citizenship.”  By this 
the council meant that it was going to get young adults involved in war activities and develop an 
interest in youth  to serve their communities.45  The bulletin was used to demonstrate that the 
youth of Schenectady wanted to be involved with their community. The two often worked 
closely together to promote discussions. The SCYC helped to organize salvage collections, held 
community war discussions, enlisted young adults to participate in the program, and “showed 
fine community spirit in uniting youth of all colors, faith, and nationality origins.”46  In order to 
promote inclusiveness, in May, 1942 the SCYC collaborated with the Morale Committee to carry 
out a program titled “I am an American Week.”  The young people were noted for their 
“imagination” during the month where an outdoor recreation block party was held downtown, 
hosting radio programs, and advertising program events effectively throughout the city.47  The 
SCYC’s efforts were greatly appreciated by the State War Council and well received by the 
community as a whole, according to the field notes.  The city was praised for being a model 
example of good teamwork between the community, schools, SCYC, and the College.  
The SCYC’s civilian mobilization division was formed by June 1942 and was known as 
the Youth Service Council (YSC).  The Council was composed of representatives of young adult 
organizations concerned with providing the youth for home front activities and preserving 
“morale through recreation.”48  The formation of the YSC was also a reflection of the state’s 
concern over juvenile delinquency and was part of the campaign to prevent it.  It appeared that 
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the Schenectady Council was concerned with juvenile delinquency and took provisions to ensure 
that it had programs available for its youth as a way to prevent problems.49  The YSC carried out 
numerous home front projects which dealt with recreation activities.  The first of which was the 
“Farewell to Service Men” program which consisted of a farewell party for the men leaving for 
service.  YSC members served as hostesses for the first USO dance, planned their own scrap 
campaign, and presented one act plays on live television entitled “The Voice of Youth.”50  The 
YSC also worked with the Recreation Committee to prevent juvenile delinquency by opening the 
teen age canteen at the Schenectady Boys’ Club.  This canteen was very popular among the 
young adults and provided dancing, games, and entertainment as a way to provide recreational 
activities for youth during the war.51  Schenectady continued to hold these canteens where 
anywhere from 110-250 young adults attended, demonstrating the “outstanding” success of the 
program. A committee of about twelve boys and girls was even formed to take over the 
responsibility of running the recreational dances.52  The YSC was also invited to aid the men 
returning home by helping to establish service centers that provided necessary information to 
returning veterans and writing to them as well, asking about their experiences so that the 
community could better prepare itself for their return.53   
According to reports, another important OCM objective carried out effectively in 
Schenectady was the Section of Civilian War Services and the Block Leader program.  By the 
end of June 1942 Schenectady County had been one of 29 local councils to establish a Civilian 
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War Services Section and by January of the following year the organization of the Block Plan 
was complete.54  Schenectady also created its own Block Service Leader’s Kit in the spring of 
1943.  It was mimeographed by the Citizen Unity Committee and distributed to all Block 
Leaders in Schenectady County.  The Kit began with a message by Mrs. Winthrop Pennock that 
highlighted the important role the Block Leaders played in carrying out the war effort at home.  
The Block Leaders were given the responsibility of helping their neighbors, a job that had a 
“close relationship” with winning the war.55  It was these volunteers’ job to combine the strength 
of their neighborhood to support the men on the war front.  The individual campaigns carried out 
by a Block Leader included a number of home front activities and ongoing programs such as 
child care, nutrition, consumer education, recreation, and war savings.56  The Kit was important 
for outlining the purpose of the Block Leader Service, which was to efficiently execute the war 
programs of the Schenectady Civilian War Services Committee.  These volunteers had to cover 
all the homes in their neighborhoods in providing each of them with the necessary war 
information and instructions required by the local council.  They also had to collect information 
from their communities while and promote cooperation among their community in neighborhood 
projects such as rallies, meetings, and parades.57  The instructional kit also provided suggestions 
for the Block leaders on the procedures they were to follow in carrying out their responsibilities 
and projects.  Lastly, the kit detailed things the Block Leaders were not supposed to do and tips 
on how to work with their neighbors.  For example, block leaders were not to gossip or spread 
rumors throughout their communities nor force anyone to participate in programs. 58  Leaflets 
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were also distributed to citizens in order to help them understand the purpose of a Block Leader 
and asking them to cooperate with her.  Schenectady took the time and effort to make sure that 
their Block Leaders were the best kind of leaders for their communities.  This service was seen 
as vital by the State Council for home front mobilization and it was therefore important that the 
volunteers did their job and carried out the Civilian War Services programs. 
Within five months of its establishment, 1359 volunteer women served as Block Leaders 
in Schenectady.  These women took on various projects as volunteers to fulfill their duties as 
neighborhood leaders.  They often canvassed their neighborhoods promoting war aims and acted 
as “instructors” to their neighbors.59 For example, in September 1943, Block Leaders canvassed 
homes for contributions to the Blood Donor Center which brought 963 pledges.  They also 
gathered data about juvenile delinquency and how it could be solved using the available 
recreational activities.60  Due to the fact that the Schenectady Council perceived juvenile 
delinquency as a large problem facing the community, it enlisted the Block Leaders to work with 
the Recreation Committee to “study the teenage problem” and come up with activities to 
promote solutions.  The Block program also worked to distribute leaflets with important war 
information such as war bonds, stamps, and garden campaigns.  Union College also hosted one 
of the largest Block Leader Training Institutes where 700 volunteers attended.  Within its first 
year, 4005 women signed up for war activity classes, 672 women signed up to become nurses, 
and 5500 people enlisted to receive Victory Garden Literature.61   
The Block Leaders also helped with the planning to determine public opinion on certain 
war time activities.   For example, at the request of the Recreation Committee, Block Leaders 
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surveyed the community asking about individual’s thoughts with regards to recreational needs.  
These volunteers were therefore important for evaluating the needs of the community during the 
war time as well.  An important project the leaders participated in was a postwar planning 
campaign towards the end of the War. 1050 leaders participated in a complete house-to-house 
canvas that was augmented by Air Raid Wardens and OCM volunteers.  Known as the Work Pile 
Campaign, a survey was given to and filled out by families in the county.  The survey contained 
70 questions about purchases made by families during the four years of war.  The purpose of the 
survey was to secure information in order to help create jobs for veterans upon their return.62  
Commending the work of the Block Leaders, the Schenectady War Council Bulletin wrote, “A 
lot of hard work has been expended in this campaign, which has brought out a new value of this 
volunteer agency of the War Council.”63  The Work-Pile survey took place at a national level 
and was vital for helping the veterans when they returned home.  The women therefore played an 
important role in determining jobs these men could do after the war.  The Schenectady Council 
therefore attempted to help solve the problem of employing veterans and planned ahead before 
they returned to their homes, demonstrating another way in which the county worked hard to 
fulfill wartime needs. The fact that Schenectady Block Leader representatives were also asked to 
go to Albany at one point to discuss their program with other localities revealed how it was a 
success.64 
Perhaps the most important OCM program carried out by the Schenectady County War 
Council was through the Child Care, Development, and Protection Committee.  In 1942 G.E. and 
A.L.C.O. combined employed 48,000 employees and were instrumental in manufacturing tanks, 
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cannons, and radar/radio equipment.  This number represented an increase of about 23,000 jobs 
since the year leading up to America’s entry into the war, which was also accompanied with 
finding replacements for about 10,000 employees who had entered the armed forces.  
Schenectady therefore had one of the most important defense industries in the state.65  
Difficulties were soon encountered when trying to meet the demands of the war because the 
available supply of experienced laborers was not sufficient enough.  Women and many residents 
from areas outside of Schenectady were therefore recruited to fill in these positions and child 
care programs would prove to be an issue. This was evident in the extensive child care program 
that developed in order to meet the needs of working mothers employed by G.E. and A.L.C.O.  
By 1944, 40% of those employed by these war production companies were women.66  By 
November 1942 it was evident that Schenectady would need more child care facilities.  At the 
time there were only four nursery school programs available to the children of the county with 
120 children already in attendance.  A third of the employees of G.E. were women and it was 
predicted that soon that number would change to 50%.  A.L.C.O. was also predicted to hire more 
female employees because so many men were leaving for service and the company wanted to 
have stable, long-term workers.   
With Schenectady playing such a large role in producing war materials, it needed to have 
child care centers for the number of mothers who were either already working or were going to 
start very soon.67 The Council therefore requested funds through the Federal Lanham Act 
beginning for the fiscal year in 1943.  In the county’s application, the Council discussed how 
there would be many more women taking on employment and needing child care facilities.  
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Schenectady requested enough funds to open up twelve child care and development centers.  The 
county identified itself as a “war impacted community” due to the war production plants located 
there, making it the busiest war production center in the Capital Region.68  The application 
discussed the effects the war had on the community, specifically how more women were leaving 
their homes and taking the place of men joining the services.  This information, when combined 
with the hours worked by the women, required that more child care facilities be opened.  The 
plan was to establish full day care for toddlers and before and after school programs for all 
children.  The facilities were to be open twelve hours a day to accommodate working mothers.69    
According to the reports, once the funds were granted and the facilities were established, 
the program itself was met with great appreciation and enthusiasm.  In order to build up 
registration of the centers, the Child Care Council publicized in the newspapers, distributed 
leaflets at war production plants, and directly interviewed mothers at the volunteer registration 
office.  According to one newspaper report, the Committee made posters and set up sign up 
tables in the factories themselves; the purpose of the program was to allow women to work for 
the war industries that needed their labor.70  During the period from April to December in 1943, 
the available child care centers made it possible for 410 families, 374 of whom had working 
mothers, to work.  A total of 521 children were taken care of by these centers.  These figures 
demonstrated that “a real war need has been met by Child Care Programs.”71  As stated in The 
New York Times in August 1943,  
Schenectady Citizens have been active in the care of children ever since we entered the  
war and have set up eleven child care centers…to keep the city’s children healthy, happy 
and occupied educationally while their mothers put in full shifts to war work or essential  
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civilian jobs.72 
 
The Child Care Committee also initiated a hot lunch and milk program and sponsored a “healthy 
and safety” rally to prepare children for the summer months.73  From these numbers and the 
available reports it appeared that Schenectady Committee met the needs of working mothers and 
their children during the war successfully.  The biggest problem that Schenectady’s Child Care 
Committee faced was the city’s inability to meet its share of the operating costs of the child care 
programs.  The city received funds from the state on the basis of number of child care days 
instead of an outright percentage.  The Committee was apparently not very willing to try and 
raise additional money.  After negotiations the School Superintendant requested that a new 
contract with the Federal Government be developed where the Federal Works Agency (which 
absorbed the WPA) would pay the rest of the operating costs that were not raised by fees, local 
contributions, and State aid.74 The request was granted and the County would only have to be 
responsible for supplementing fees during “hardship cases.”75 
The controversy over the establishment of child care facilities at the national level was 
not reflected in Schenectady.  Due to the fact that the city played such an important role in New 
York’s production, child care programs were in high demand and supported by many who 
understood mothers needed to work.  Schenectady was the first in the state to provide the 
necessary amount of child care facilities proportional to the number of working mothers within 
its first year of operation.76  By 1944, Schenectady County had requested more Lanham Act 
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grants to support the funding of more child care facilities, trying to translate the plan into a 
postwar program.  In March 1944 the War Council was concerned because G.E. (which was the 
largest industrial employer in Schenectady) showed a “projected decline” in factory employment 
for the first time in the war.77  According to the records, 2,500 workers were transferred to the 
plant and resulted in 100s of women losing their jobs.  With the war coming to a close and 
veterans returning home, it was estimated that 1,300 more women would lose their jobs by July 
1944.  The peak of employed women had also already been reached in the summer of 1943. 
Although the number of working mothers had decreased as the war was winding down, child 
care enrolment was expected to rise again in the upcoming months.  
As the war was coming to a close, allocation of state funds for child care centers became 
questionable.  Requests were sent in to extend the program through May 1946.  The Schenectady 
Child Care Committee justified the extension because its programs had the largest child 
enrollment in New York State, which was more than 400 by January 1944.78   The Committee 
argued that “homes have actually been held together because of Child Care Center Facilities.”79  
Letters were sent to the Chairman of the Child Care Committee by the plants and industries as 
proof of the importance of the facilities in the daily lives of the working parents and therefore the 
war plants productivity.   For example, the assistant supervisor of personnel at G.E. described 
how women were still needed for employment at the plant and that the child care centers had to 
stay open.  In a letter sent by the Schenectady Chamber of Commerce, the Vice President of the 
Chamber described how the war workers depended on the services provided by the child care 
facilities and that this need would only increase because more and more women workers were 
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demanded during a time of war.80  Perhaps one of the most important industries aided by the 
child care facilities was Ellis Hospital. For those nurses who were mothers, “it has meant peace 
of mind and better service in meeting the needs of the sick wherever women have been able to 
make satisfactory plans for the care of children during working hours.”  The need for nurses and 
hospital workers would only increase when the war ended; meaning that the child care facilities 
would still be very important and needed to remain open.81  Reports also indicated how the 
community itself showed an interest in the Schenectady County Child Care Program.  For 
example, the Schenectady War Chest contributed funds to the child care programs, radio stations 
helped to publicize openings in the centers, and three churches contributed space for nursery 
schools.82 Due to the combined efforts of the community that made it clear the child care 
programs were still a necessity, grants were extended through the end of May, 1946, and 
working mothers were given the help they needed to fulfill their duties at work.  From the 
number of children and mothers provided service by the programs when combined with the fact 
that the facilities continued to stay open demonstrated that Child Care in Schenectady was 
successful.        
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 Every student of American history has been taught the importance of World War II for its 
impact on countries both directly and indirectly involved in the conflict.  This monumental event 
shaped the future course of many nations and also taught the world an important lesson about the 
repercussions of unchecked aggression and evil intentions in the 20th century.  A significant 
aspect of the war was its impact on the Americans of the home front.  Wars have typically been 
catalysts of social and economic changes in the countries involved, whether negative or positive, 
and World War II was no exception.  On a national level, the War helped America leave the 
Great Depression it its wake, led to the internment of 1000s of Japanese Americans, and was 
instrumental in developing new war technologies never before imagined.  World War II changed 
the lives of not only those fighting on the front but the individuals who remained at home 
combating the war in their own way.  An important effort at both the national and state level 
during the war became mobilizing civilians to serve the home front.   
 One of the states that put a tremendous amount of effort into home front mobilization was 
New York.  With the establishment of its Defense Council prior to the war and the War Council 
after the attack on Pearl Harbor, stimulating individuals to volunteer became a primary concern 
of the state.   The War Council therefore established the Office of Civilian Mobilization (OCM) 
to organize and implement the state’s volunteer programs.  Did the state’s efforts prove 
successful in rousing citizens to engage in a grass roots mobilization to build a strong home 
front?  A popular belief about World War II was that it was the “best war ever” because it was 
supported by a unified home front devoted to patriotic efforts.  By evaluating the records of the 
New York State War Council and the OCM, a different story is told.  
 The greatest conclusion to be drawn from the documents is that the OCM worked hard to 
try and get individuals to volunteer.  After accomplishing their main task of setting up volunteer 
offices, the OCM’s primary focus became implementing the programs and ensuring they were 
effectively carried out.  A consistent theme demonstrated throughout the Office’s reports and 
accounts is that it was continuously frustrated by the local councils’ inefficiency and lack of 
commitment to community services.  The OCM proved to be unremitting in its efforts to get the 
localities to perform up to its standards and stimulate volunteer activities.  It was apparent that 
many local councils did not live up to the expectations of the state-planners.  Some councils did 
fulfill their duties and revealed that the Office’s efforts did not go to waste.  One of these was the 
Schenectady County War Council, which served as an example to many other localities because 
it had started many of its own programs and took initiatives throughout the war.  For the most 
part, the OCM’s records demonstrated that civilian mobilization was not a natural disposition for 
many citizens and that a large effort on the state official’s parts was required for local councils to 
be successful.  Participation in volunteer efforts was therefore quite irregular and World War II 
did not galvanize patriotic activity to the extent popularized by many early historical sources.   
The efforts of the OCM also revealed the significant role played by women in the state’s 
volunteer efforts.  Reflecting the concerns on a national level about the effects of the war on 
American society, the Office and state wanted to preserve the moral ideals and attitudes of a 
prewar nation that was in the midst of significant changes.  The OCM therefore set out to try and 
maintain the traditional American values by establishing ways to derail youth from engaging in 
illicit behavior and providing help to mothers and families facing problems caused by the war.  
This included appealing to women to sacrifice their time for volunteer efforts.  The OCM created 
programs and positions, such as the Block Leader Program, targeted towards women that 
allowed them to directly serve their communities.  The majority of Block Leaders were women 
in New York (and across the nation) and provided opportunities for them to hold leadership roles 
in their communities.  This evidence disputed the argument made by many earlier scholars that 
the war was “good” because it was a turning point for American women that changed people’s 
perception of their capabilities and place in society.  The OCM revealed that large numbers of 
women volunteered and therefore took the “traditional” route to serving the war effort at home, 
allowing for prewar conventional attitudes to persist.     
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